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I. Introduction 
Taxation is one of the hottest legal topics today. When 
President Donald J. Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA)1 into law on December 22, 2017, it represented the most 
sweeping tax reform in generations.2 In the area of tax law, no 
issue is more important than the proper rate of corporate taxation 
in the United States.3 The TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate 
                                                                                                     
 1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 2. See Julia Horowitz, 34 Things You Need to Know About the Incoming Tax 
Law, CNNMONEY (Dec. 26, 2017, 9:59 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/20/news/economy/republican-tax-reform-
everything-you-need-to-know/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“[The Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act] is the first significant reform of the U.S. tax code since 1986.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Tankersley, Washington’s 
Fight Over Taxes Is Only Beginning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/business/washingtons-fight-over-taxes-is-
only-beginning.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“An old Washington axiom is 
that Congress passes a major tax overhaul once every 30 years. By that logic, the 
sweeping 2017 tax law, which was raced through Congress by Republicans before 
it was signed in late December by President Trump, was right on time.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Deirdre Walsh et al., White House, 
GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNNPOLITICS (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trump-
taxbill/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“Republican lawmakers joined 
President Donald Trump . . . to celebrate their largest legislative achievement of 
2017, in a public ceremony spotlighting the most sweeping overhaul of the US tax 
system in more than 30 years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 3. See Shaun Terrill, Corrections and Substantive Fixes Needed with 
Respect to Employee Benefit Changes Made by the 2017 Tax Act, BLOOMBERG BNA: 
FED. TAX BLOG (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.bna.com/corrections-substantive-
fixes-b57982088882/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“On December 22, President 
Trump signed into law . . . the first major overhaul of the U.S. tax system in 30 
years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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from 35% to 21%.4 While some business-related deductions and 
credits were reduced or eliminated, the tax cut represents a major 
windfall for corporate America.5 Some estimate that the savings to 
corporations and cost to tax payers will be around $1 trillion.6 One 
of the major reasons that politicians advanced for changing the law 
was that the corporate tax rate was driving corporations to relocate 
overseas and to engage in various tax avoidance strategies to 
reduce their tax burdens.7 Whether the TCJA will reduce this 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Amanda Becker & David Morgan, What’s in the Final Republican 
Tax Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-
provisions-factbox/whats-in-the-final-republican-tax-bill-idUSKBN1ED27K (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2019) (reporting that the final version of the bill that was signed 
into law as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act “[c]uts corporate income tax rate 
permanently to 21 percent from 35 percent, as of Jan. 1, 2018”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Tara Golshan, 4 Winners and 4 Losers from 
the Republican Tax Bill, VOX (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/12/20/16790040/gop-tax-bill-winners (last visited Feb. 
18, 2019) (“This bill permanently cuts the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 
21 percent to bring it closer to that of countries like Canada, which has a 15 
percent corporate tax rate, or Ireland, which has a 12.5 percent rate.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sabrina Siddiqui, Ben Jacobs & 
Lauren Gambino, Senate Approves Most Drastic Changes to US Tax Code in 30 
Years, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/dec/19/donald-trump-tax-bill-plan-house-approves-senate (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2019) (“The bill lowers the top individual tax rate from 39.6% to 37% and 
slashes the corporate tax rate to 21%, a dramatic fall from its current rate of 
35%.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See David Harding, Michael Mankins & Karen Harris, What U.S. CEOs 
Should Do with the Money from Corporate Tax Cuts, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 1, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/what-u-s-ceos-should-do-with-the-money-from-
corporate-tax-cuts (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“The new U.S. tax law is likely to 
increase after-tax cash flows for U.S.-based companies by anywhere from 10% to 
20%, depending on their current tax position. . . . The size of this windfall is 
remarkable . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian 
Peccarelli, Too Early to Call the Winners and Losers of Major Corporate Tax Cut, 
HILL (Dec. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/365239-too-early-to-call-
the-winners-and-losers-of-major-corporate-tax-cut (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) 
(“[The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act] is . . . the one piece of the tax reform legislation 
that the left and right agree would produce benefits for its intended audience: big 
businesses.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See Peccarelli, supra note 5 (“It’s hard to overemphasize the significance 
of the Republican proposal to cut the corporate tax rate to 21 percent. At an 
estimated cost of $1 trillion, it’s the headline and most expensive measure in the 
entire tax reform package.”). 
 7. See Akane Otani, Richard Rubin & Theo Francis, Boom in Share 
Buybacks Renews Question of Who Wins From Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boom-in-share-buybacks-renews-question-of-
who-wins-from-tax-cuts-1519900200 (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (“The long-run 
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problem remains unclear. With that said, it is unlikely that tax 
avoidance can ever be completely eliminated.8 
The permissibility of corporate tax avoidance is a central issue 
in tax law. As of June 7, 2017, seventy-six countries and 
jurisdictions signed or formally expressed their intention to sign 
the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(Convention), a multilateral agreement that is designed to reduce 
corporate tax avoidance practices by multinational businesses by 
closing gaps in existing international tax law.9 The Convention is 
the product of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project,10 which involves collaboration by the thirty-four members 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), all G20 members, and more than forty developing 
countries.11 Notably, the United States is not a signatory.12 
Although the Trump Administration has shown a recurrent 
hostility to binding itself to international agreements, the United 
States’ unwillingness to sign the Convention is surprising 
                                                                                                     
economic case for the corporate tax cut was that the rate reduction and incentives 
for business investment would give companies more reasons to invest in the U.S., 
because projects that didn’t make financial sense would become profitable.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive 
Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 
TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (“No one seriously suggests that tax avoidance and evasion 
could be completely eliminated in real world contexts. Indeed, historical 
experience with fundamental tax reform suggests that high-income taxpayers will 
eventually find numerous ways to circumvent any plausible real world forms of 
taxation.”). 
 9. See Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures 
to Prevent BEPS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) 
(providing an overview of the agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 10. See id. (explaining that the treaty “offers concrete solutions . . . by 
transposing results from the OECD/G20 BEPS Project into bilateral tax treaties 
worldwide”). 
 11. See id. (providing a list of signatories and parties to the agreement). 
 12. See id. (showing the absence of the United States from the list of 
signatories or jurisdictions expressing their intent to sign). 
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considering the seriousness of the issue. The OECD estimates that 
tax avoidance practices by multinational firms may lead to up to 
$240 billion of lost tax revenue globally, which is the equivalent of 
10% of global corporate tax revenues.13 In the United States, the 
Congressional Research Service estimates tax revenue losses of 
$100 billion due to tax avoidance.14 A recent study suggests that 
that 73% of Fortune 500 companies use tax havens.15 The study 
notes, “American multinational companies collectively reported 
forty-three percent of their foreign earnings in five small tax haven 
countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.”16 In short, the impact of tax avoidance is substantial, 
important, and pressing. 
Notably, tax avoidance should not be confused with tax 
evasion. While tax evasion is the illegal nonpayment or 
underpayment of taxes, corporate tax avoidance is the structuring 
of business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a 
manner that technically complies with the law but violates the 
spirit of the law.17 As a result, avoidance is distinguishable from 
evasion by the legality of the action.18 For purposes of this Article, 
corporate tax avoidance should also be differentiated from tax 
minimization. Corporate tax minimization involves arranging a 
firm’s affairs in a way envisioned by the legislative body to reduce 
the firm’s tax burden.19 The Supreme Court of the United States 
and other judicial bodies have regularly held that this type of 
                                                                                                     
 13. See OECD, POLICY BRIEF: TAXING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, BASE 
EROSION AND PROFITS SHIFTING (BEPS) 1 (Oct. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/policy-
briefs/PB-Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-(BEPS-III)-Oct-2015.pdf (discussing the 
global impact of base erosion and profit shifting).  
 14. See JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1 (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (explaining the impact of corporate 
profit shifting).  
 15.  See RICHARD PHILLIPS ET AL., OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES 2016: THE USE OF 
OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS BY FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES 1 (2016), 
http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshellgames2016.pdf (explaining that at least 367 of 
Fortune 500 companies “operate one or more subsidiaries in tax haven 
countries”).  
 16. Id. at 2 (citing a 2008 Congressional Research Service Report). 
 17. See infra Part II.A (defining tax evasion). 
 18. See infra Part II.A (explaining the difference between tax avoidance and 
tax evasion). 
 19. See infra Part II.A (discussing tax minimization). 
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behavior is legally permissible.20 Because tax minimization 
complies with both the letter and the spirit of the law, one would 
have a hard time arguing that corporations should be blamed for 
this behavior. If any entity should be faulted for tax minimization, 
the legislative body establishing the tax regime should receive the 
blame. Obviously, bright lines do not exist between tax evasion and 
tax avoidance, and between tax avoidance and tax minimization. 
These concepts often blur into each other. 
While corporate tax evasion is prohibited because of the 
illegality of the behavior, the question of whether corporate tax 
avoidance is permissible is a much more difficult one. Some 
corporate managers and tax advisors claim that aggressive tax 
avoidance is mandated based upon the fiduciary duties owed 
within the corporation.21 Explicitly or implicitly, they rely on the 
holding in the seminal case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,22 in which 
the Supreme Court of Michigan held that “[a] business corporation 
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a 
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”); 
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) 
(“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he 
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not 
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”); see also Jerome B. Libin, Congress 
Should Address Tax Avoidance Head-On: The Internal Revenue Code Needs a 
GAAR, 30 VA. TAX REV. 339, 352 (2010) (“Tax minimization is part of our taxpayer 
culture. Tax minimization within the boundaries of the law has been approved, if 
not encouraged, by the Supreme Court.”); Allen D. Madison, The Legal 
Framework for Tax Compliance, 70 TAX LAW. 497, 521–22 (2017) (“[T]axpayers 
are entitled to make choices in their lives—taking into account the government’s 
communications of its expectations for reporting—that minimize their taxes.”). 
 21. See Jasmine M. Fisher, Note, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 337, 348–49 (2014) (“Some 
corporate leaders and analysts perceive tax avoidance as unproblematic, pointing 
to lawmakers’ failures to make such practices illegal as an indication of its 
acceptability. . . . Corporate leaders may even view tax avoidance as obligatory; 
as part of their fiduciary duties to shareholders.”); Alexander J. Morgenstern, 
Note, Corporate Tax Avoidance: Addressing the Merits of Preventing 
Multinational Corporations from Engaging in the Practice and Repatriating 
Overseas Profits, 16 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 333, 334 (2017) (“Many corporate executives 
justify corporate participation in tax avoidance as being ‘capitalistic’ or 
encompassed in their fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.”). 
 22. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
COLLABORATION THEORY 99 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.”23 This holding can be derived from the fiduciary duties 
that management owes to the corporation and its shareholders, 
especially the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith.24 As 
discussed in my recent article with Professor Karie 
Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Honoring the 
Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders, 
although the holding in Dodge remains true in general, the Dodge 
mandate fails to require tax avoidance in any specific instance 
because of the discretion that is granted to corporate managers 
under the business judgment rule.25 As a result, a vacuum is 
created regarding when engaging in tax avoidance is required, 
permissible, or prohibited.26 One potentially can look to the fields 
of corporate social responsibility, business ethics, and economics to 
fill this vacuum,27 but the issue lingers whether corporate tax 
avoidance is legally required, permissible, or prohibited. 
This Article argues that aggressive corporate tax avoidance is 
legally impermissible based upon the essential nature of the 
corporate form. The history of the debate over the essential nature 
of the corporation is substantial.28 This debate has been 
reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s recent opinions, Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission29 and Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.,30 which explore the scope of corporate rights.31   
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 684. 
 24. See infra Part III.B (explaining how the Dodge mandate can be derived 
from the fiduciary duties that corporate managers owe the corporation and its 
stockholders). 
 25. See Eric C. Chaffee & Karie Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance 
and Honoring the Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders, 
58 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1429–30 (2017) (discussing the scope of the Dodge mandate 
that corporations be run primarily for profit). 
 26. See id. at 1470 (“[A]lthough the Dodge mandate remains true in general, 
it provides little guidance in specific matters, including tax avoidance.”). 
 27. See id. at 1473–80 (discussing the role that the fields of corporate social 
responsibility, business ethics, and economics can play in determining whether 
corporations should engage in tax avoidance). 
 28. See infra Part IV (discussing the three prevailing theories of the 
corporation that have developed over the past few centuries: artificial entity 
theory, real entity theory, and aggregate theory). 
 29. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 30. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 31. See generally, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the 
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The debate has yielded three prevailing theories of the 
corporation. First, the artificial entity theory, which is also 
referred to as concession theory, suggests that corporations are 
artificial entities that owe their existence completely to the 
government.32 Second, the real entity theory, which is also referred 
to as the natural entity theory, suggests that each corporation has 
an existence and identity that is separate and apart from the 
individuals who organize, operate, and own it.33 Third, the 
aggregate theory, which is also known as the nexus of contracts 
theory, suggests that a corporation is a collection of individuals 
joined together through the intersection of various obligations.34 
                                                                                                     
Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999; Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood 
and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; Margaret M. Blair & 
Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); Teneille R. Brown, In-corp-o-real: A 
Psychological Critique of Corporate Personhood and Citizens United, 12 FLA. ST. 
U. BUS. REV. 1 (2013); Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian 
Association, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2012); Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the 
Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2013); Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy 
Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care Act, and the 
Corporate Person: How a Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 
7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201 (2014); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of 
Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879 
(2012); Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47 
(2015); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional 
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221 (2011); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with 
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 125 (2013); Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of 
Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2013); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent 
Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013) [hereinafter Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate 
Theory]; Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 
327 (2014) [hereinafter Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory]; Martin 
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 27 (2014); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629 [hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate 
Personhood]; Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After 
Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional 
Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011). 
 32. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the artificial entity theory of the 
corporation). 
 33. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the real entity theory of the corporation). 
 34. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the aggregate theory of the corporation). 
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While each of the prevailing essentialist theories of the 
corporation is compelling because they describe some aspect of the 
corporate form, each fails to provide a robust definition of what is 
a corporation. The artificial entity theory, for instance, focuses on 
the role of the government in creating the corporation, but it 
largely ignores the role of the individuals organizing, operating, 
and owning the corporation.35 The real entity theory focuses on the 
corporation as a separate entity, but it largely ignores the role of 
the government in creating the corporation and the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the entity.36 In addition, the 
aggregate theory focuses on the individuals organizing, operating, 
and owning the corporation, but it largely ignores the role of the 
government in creating the corporation and does little to explain 
the corporation’s separate legal status.37 Moreover, all of the 
prevailing theories concentrate on the question of how corporations 
exist without answering why corporations exist. Because 
determining the essential nature of a corporation is a definitional 
inquiry, an essentialist theory that answers both questions is 
needed. 
In my recent work, I have developed an essentialist theory of 
the corporation that I refer to as “collaboration theory.”38 
Collaboration theory posits that the corporation is a collaboration 
among the government and the individuals organizing, operating, 
and owning the corporation. For purposes of my theory, 
collaboration is defined as a common effort between or among 
multiple entities to accomplish a task or a project. In regard to 
for-profit corporations, the common project is economic 
development and economic gain. This theory is superior to the 
existing essentialist theories because it explains how corporations 
                                                                                                     
 35. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the artificial entity theory of the 
corporation). 
 36. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the real entity theory of the corporation). 
 37. See infra Part IV.C (explaining the aggregate theory of the corporation). 
 38. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A Theory of the 
Charitable Tax Exempt Nonprofit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719 (2016) 
[hereinafter Chaffee, Collaboration Theory] (introducing and explaining 
collaboration theory as an essentialist theory of the corporation); Eric C. Chaffee, 
The Origins of Corporate Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 353 (2017) 
[hereinafter Chaffee, Corporate Social Responsibility] (applying collaboration 
theory to the questions of why and when corporations should engage in socially 
responsible behavior). 
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exist (i.e. as a collaboration among the government and the 
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation), 
and why corporations exist (i.e. for economic development and 
economic gain). The goals of the government and the individuals 
do vary a bit in the sense that the government is seeking social 
economic development and gain, and the individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning the corporation are seeking personal 
economic development and gain. However, in most collaborations, 
goals and interests do not perfectly align, and collaboration theory 
offers a robust and compelling definition of what is a corporation. 
This theory has generally been well received.39 
By understanding the corporation as a collaboration between 
the government and the individuals organizing, operating, and 
owning the corporation, the impermissibility of aggressive 
corporate tax avoidance becomes apparent. Collaborators in 
business ventures owe each other a duty of good faith,40 and the 
contractual nature of the corporation carries with it a duty of a 
good faith as well.41 As a result, the notion becomes fanciful that 
depriving the government of revenue through aggressive corporate 
tax avoidance strategies is required or even permissible. Tax 
avoidance is by definition violating the spirit of the law, and it is 
an affront to the collaboration that forms the foundation of the 
corporate form because it frustrates one of the government’s 
purposes for entering the collaboration, i.e., gaining revenue.42 
This Article advances the existing scholarship in three main 
ways. First, this Article breaks new grounds by being the first piece 
to examine how essentialist theories of the corporation should 
inform the permissibility of corporate tax avoidance. Only after one 
                                                                                                     
 39. This work was featured on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation. Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 
28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/28/the-origins-of-corporate-
social-responsibility/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 40. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the duty of good faith that collaborators 
in business ventures owe each other). 
 41. See infra note 263 (explaining the implied duty of good faith that 
underlies all contractual relationships). 
 42. See infra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax avoidance). 
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understands what a corporation is can one understand what 
obligations a corporation has. Remarkably, no other article has 
explored how essentialist theories of the corporation apply in the 
corporate tax avoidance context. Second, this Article breaks new 
ground because it explores how collaboration theory, a new theory 
of the corporation that I developed, applies to corporate tax 
avoidance. Third, this Article answers the question of whether 
corporations are permitted or required to engage in aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies. Once it becomes apparent that corporate 
managers are not mandated by their fiduciary duties to engage in 
aggressive tax avoidance, a vacuum is created regarding whether 
corporate managers have any legal obligations regarding such 
behavior.43 This Article argues that based upon the essential 
nature of the corporate form as a collaboration, corporate 
managers are legally required not to engage in aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies because they violate the spirit of the law and 
the duties of good faith that undergird the corporation. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II 
defines tax avoidance, explains why corporations engage in such 
behavior, and why such behavior is wrong. Part III explores why 
managers are not required to engage in corporate tax avoidance 
based upon the fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation 
and its stockholders, which demonstrates that there is a lack of 
understanding of when engaging in tax avoidance is required, 
permissible, or prohibited. Part IV suggests that the essential 
nature of the corporation is the place to begin in understanding 
when tax avoidance is allowable and explores the prevailing 
theories of the corporation, including artificial entity theory, real 
entity, and aggregate theory. Part V discusses collaboration 
theory, a theory that I have developed that better describes the 
essential nature of the corporation. Part VI applies collaboration 
theory to corporate tax avoidance and determines that corporate 
tax avoidance should be avoided because it violates the duties the 
individuals organizing, owning, and operating the corporation owe 
to the government as collaborators in the corporate form. Part VII 
provides brief concluding remarks. 
                                                                                                     
 43. See infra Part III.C (explaining that corporate managers have broad 
discretion in how they go about seeking profit for the entity). 
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II. Understanding Tax Avoidance 
As a starting point, a few brief words ought to be offered about 
the contours of tax avoidance. This Part explores the definition of 
that term and its benefits and harms. 
A. Defining Tax Avoidance 
For purposes of this Article, tax avoidance is defined as 
structuring business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations 
in a manner that technically complies with the law but violates the 
spirit or underlying policies of the law.44 To put that definition in 
the context of tax compliance behavior, one must understand what 
I shall term the “spectrum of tax compliance behavior.” 
At one end of the spectrum exists unreflective compliance in 
which a taxpayer simply undertakes an activity without reflecting 
on the tax implications. For example, many individuals purchase 
homes, obtain educational loans, and undertake work activities 
without prospectively considering how these activities might 
impact the amount of taxes that they owe to the government.45 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Derek E. Anderson, Turning the Corporate Inversion Transaction 
Right Side Up: Proposed Legislation in the 108th Congress Aims to Stamp Out 
Any Economic Vitality of the Corporate Inversion Transaction, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
267, 286 n.71 (2004) (“[N]aked tax avoidance, as openly admitted by various 
companies is clearly contrary to public policy and the spirit of the IRC.”); Assaf 
Likhovski, ‘‘Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 665, 691 (2007) (“Tax avoidance . . . is . . . the attempt to follow the 
letter of the law ignoring the legislator’s intention (or the ‘spirit’ of the law) . . . .”); 
Daniel T. Ostas & Axel Hilling, Global Tax Shelters, the Ethics of Interpretation, 
and the Need for a Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 745, 749 (2016) 
(“Tax avoidance refers to not paying a tax or paying a reduced tax based on the 
assertion of a literal interpretation of tax law that one knows was not intended 
by the legislature, and if challenged, may not prevail in court.”). 
 45. See Kate Leifeld, Creating Access to Tax Benefits: How Pro Bono Tax 
Professionals Can Help Low-Income Taxpayers Claim the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, 62 ME. L. REV. 543, 556 (2010) (“Taxpayers often do not understand what 
information the IRS needs or why their documentation is insufficient.”); Sagit 
Leviner, The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer Compliance: An Empirical 
Investigation with Policy Implications, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2012) (“With 
the growing complexity of the tax code, many taxpayers do not understand their 
filing requirements and face significant difficulties completing tax forms by 
themselves.”); Susan Striz, Note, The Key to Closing the Tax Gap: Understanding, 
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Importantly, however, just because an individual or entity 
undertakes a form of tax compliance behavior in one context does 
not mean that they will undertake the same type of tax compliance 
behavior in all contexts. To put it another way, the completely 
oblivious tax payer is likely a rarity. 
Next to unreflective compliance on the spectrum of tax 
compliance behavior is tax minimization. This type of behavior 
occurs when a taxpayer reflectively makes tax compliance 
decisions with the goal of reducing that taxpayer’s tax burden 
within the intended scope of the law; this type of behavior is 
completely permissible.46 For example, this type of behavior might 
occur in a situation in which a taxpayer opts to schedule two 
surgeries that are not covered by insurance within the same tax 
year to maximize the taxpayer’s health care deduction under § 213 
of the Internal Revenue Code.47 It might also occur in a 
circumstance in which a taxpayer chooses to do a large amount of 
charitable giving in a single tax year to maximize their charitable 
tax deduction under § 170.48 
After tax minimization comes tax avoidance. As previously 
mentioned, in the corporate context, tax avoidance is defined as 
structuring business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations 
in a manner that technically complies with the law but violates the 
spirit or underlying policies of the law.49 However, the concept can 
obviously be extended more broadly than the corporate tax context. 
It extends to any instance in which a taxpayer attempts to exploit 
an unintended weakness in the tax code.50 
                                                                                                     
112 W. VA. L. REV. 1053, 1077 (2010) (“Due to the complexity of the tax code, many 
taxpayers make unintentional errors simply because they do not understand 
what they are doing.”).  
 46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (reporting that tax 
minimization is legally acceptable). 
 47. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction the 
expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . . . to the 
extent that such expenses exceed 10 percent of adjusted gross income.”). Notably, 
the 10% was reduced to 7.5% for “any taxable year . . . beginning after December 
31, 2016, and ending before January 1, 2019.” I.R.C. § 213(f) (2012).  
 48. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction any 
charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year.”). 
 49. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing a definition of tax 
avoidance). 
 50. See Dora Arash, Crummey Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual 
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Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum from unreflective 
compliance is tax evasion. Tax evasion occurs when an individual 
violates the tax law and includes any sort of behavior that violates 
the law regardless of whether it is willful or not.51 Importantly, tax 
avoidance, as used in this Article, in no way involves illegal 
conduct. 
B. The Benefits and Harms of Tax Avoidance 
With the definition of tax avoidance explained, the issue now 
becomes whether tax avoidance is a good or bad thing. As the 
introduction to this Article reveals, tax avoidance is certainly 
popular in corporate America.52 If tax avoidance is completely bad, 
this reality would not exist. This subpart explores the benefits and 
                                                                                                     
Exclusion, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 83, 84 (1993) (“The imposition of taxes generally 
fosters an intense ambition on the part of those individuals adversely affected by 
such taxes to seek means of avoidance. Tax practitioners . . . search for and 
discover loopholes within the tax law that can be utilized for the purpose of tax 
avoidance.”); Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent 
Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 199 n.19 (1996) (“As opposed to tax evasion, which identifies 
tax reduction by illegal means, tax avoidance is used to describe the reduction of 
tax liability by legal means. Tax avoidance, however, has pejorative overtones, 
especially in the context of artificial arrangements, loopholes, anomalies, or other 
deficiencies of tax law.”); T. Modibo Ocran, Double Taxation Treaties and 
Transnational Investment: A Comparative Study, 2 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 131, 138 
(1989) (“Tax avoidance . . . occurs where the taxpayer takes advantage of 
loopholes in the tax laws. . . . [T]ax avoidance does not technically infringe the 
law, even though it may be equally damaging to the host state and can be morally 
reprehensible.”). 
 51. See James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
521, 524–25 (2017) (“[T]he phrase ‘tax evasion’ refers to illegal and intentional 
actions taken by taxpayers to circumvent their legally due tax obligations by 
underreporting incomes, overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits, failing to 
file appropriate tax returns, and even engaging in barter.”); Kayal Munisami, The 
Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in Solving the Great Corporate Tax Dodge, 
17 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 55, 55–56 (2018) (“[T]ax evasion . . .  is clearly and 
uniformly illegal across jurisdictions . . . .”); Kyle Richard, Are All Tax Rulings 
State Aid? Examining the European Commission's Recent State Aid Decisions, 18 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 8 n.20 (2018) ("[T]ax evasion . . . involves the illegal 
underpayment (or non-payment) of taxes by a taxpayer.”). 
 52. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text (discussing the 
widespread use of tax avoidance by large corporations). 
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harms of tax avoidance, and explains the reasons why the harms 
outweigh the benefits. 
 Tax avoidance has six major benefits. First, tax avoidance 
benefits the corporation itself because if a corporation can lower its 
tax burden through tax avoidance, then the financial performance 
of the firm will improve.53 Second, if the financial performance of 
the corporation improves through tax avoidance, corporate 
managers are likely to be rewarded because of the improved 
financial performance of the firm.54 Third, if the corporation is 
doing well, stockholders will likely reap the benefit in the form of 
increased value of their shares and dividends.55 Fourth, if the 
corporation is doing well, creditors, employees, and other 
stakeholders will also reap the benefit by having greater assurance 
that debts will be repaid, and they will prosper.56 Fifth, if the 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Joshua D. Blank, The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
449, 497 (2017) (“[A]s U.S. corporations can claim valuable tax losses and other 
tax benefits that reduce their taxable income and tax liability without reducing 
their earnings for financial accounting purposes, corporate tax directors often face 
pressure, from shareholders and non-tax management, to pursue tax avoidance 
strategies.”); Orly Sulami, Tax Abuse—Lessons from Abroad, 65 SMU L. REV. 551, 
559 (2012) (“Taxpayers often . . . benefit on their financial statements from 
abusive tax avoidance arrangements.”).  
 54. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 24 (2014) (“If tax is considered a 
cost . . . , it behooves the management to try to minimize this cost, or even turn it 
into a profit. Thus, the goal of shareholder profit maximization can naturally lead 
to corporations trying to minimize taxes and thus enhance earnings per share.”); 
Noam Noked, Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, 9 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 221, 230 (2017) (“There is evidence which shows that a higher 
level of incentive compensation is associated with an increased level of tax 
avoidance, especially among firms with better corporate governance.”). 
 55. See Dennis F. Dunne, The Revlon Duties and the Sale of Companies in 
Chapter 11, 52 BUS. LAW. 1333, 1345 (1997) (“In exchange for placing their capital 
at risk, the stockholders will prosper if the company succeeds.”); Kent Greenfield, 
Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1054 (2008) 
(“[S]hareholders benefit only when the firm prospers.”); Robert C. Illig, The 
Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance 
Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 49 (2008) (“[I]nstitutional 
investors have a direct financial interest in the success of the corporations in 
which they invest. As professional stockholders, institutional investors 
presumably prosper when their investments appreciate and languish when they 
disappoint.”). 
 56. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 789, 804–05 (2007) (“[W]hile shareholders may share in the wealth when 
the corporation does well and suffer when the firm does poorly, so may employees, 
creditors, and other stakeholders.”). 
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corporation is performing well, society will benefit from increased 
economic growth, especially because it is usually the largest 
corporations that engage in tax avoidance.57 Sixth, if corporations 
are doing well, the government will also likely benefit because the 
electorate will be happy, assuming that tax avoidance leads to a 
stronger national economy.58 
The problem is that the harms of tax avoidance offset and 
eclipse the benefits. Firms that undertake aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies typically draw additional governmental 
scrutiny as a result of their behavior,59 and they are increasingly 
drawing scorn from the public.60 Tax avoidance deprives the 
government of necessary funds to do its job properly,61 and it allows 
                                                                                                     
 57. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (reporting that 73% of Fortune 
500 companies reduce their tax burden through the use of tax havens). 
 58. Cf. Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Mary Stegmaier, Presidential 
Popularity Rises and Falls with the Stock Market, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. U.S. 
CTR. (Sept. 23, 2013) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2013/09/23/presidential-
popularity-stock-market/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (concluding that presidential 
approval ratings are higher during times of economic growth) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. See Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising 
Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 585–86 
(2006) (“Recently, abusive tax shelters and customized tax planning have shone 
a particularly unappealing light on lawyers who single-mindedly pursue their 
clients’ tax-reduction goals . . . . The government’s answer to abusive tax 
transactions has been greater transparency, tougher sanctions, and more 
vigorous enforcement . . . .”). 
 60. See Allison Christians, Avoidance, Evasion, and Taxpayer Morality, 44 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 41 (2014) (“[T]he ongoing media coverage of single-digit 
effective tax rates paid on a global basis by household brand companies like GE, 
Google, Apple, Starbucks, and Amazon, taught the public about an epidemic of 
tax avoidance, often characterized as ‘aggressive’ to move it conceptually closer to 
the concept of evasion.”); Sara Dillon, Tax Avoidance, Revenue Starvation and the 
Age of the Multinational Corporation, 50 INT’L LAW. 275, 276 (2017) (“Tax 
avoidance by large corporations is well-established, standard practice, and the 
global public has waited in vain for effective steps to be taken to bring it to an 
end.”); Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 185 (2014) (“[P]ress coverage is 
important because public perception matters to legislators on Capitol Hill and the 
public is becoming increasingly aware of the corporate tax avoidance issue.”). 
 61. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax 
Avoidance, 62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 54 (2015) (“IP-based tax avoidance imposes 
enormous economic harm: distorted worldwide investment decisions by 
multinationals that lower economic output; massive tax revenue losses, with 
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corporations to shirk paying their fair share of taxes, which angers 
the public.62 Even if one views tax avoidance as an implicit tax 
subsidy because governments sometimes tolerate or ignore it, tax 
avoidance erodes confidence in the tax system and the democratic 
process in general because tax avoidance is defined as structuring 
business transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a 
manner that technically complies with the law but violates the 
spirit or underlying policies of the law.63 In sum, the harms of tax 
avoidance outweigh its benefits because of the problems it creates. 
III. Corporate Fiduciary Duties and the Requirement to Engage in 
Tax Avoidance (or Lack Thereof) 
While tax avoidance does have negative consequences, the 
benefit to a corporation can be substantial. The issue then becomes 
whether corporate managers are legally required, permitted, or 
                                                                                                     
results like higher government deficits, lower spending, and higher taxes on 
individuals; and the high transaction costs involved in implementing the 
tax-avoidance strategies.”). 
 62. See Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 
521, 538 (“The selfishness of tax avoidance is promoted, even admired, despite the 
fact that reduction of tax liability harms others.”); Julie Roin, Taxation Without 
Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 75 (2002) (“[Tax avoidance’s] sole real-world 
effect is to decrease government revenues. Those who regard this effect to be 
harmless fail to appreciate the fact that such lost revenue must be recouped, 
generally by increasing taxes on other taxpayers or by moving to different taxing 
mechanisms.”). 
 63. See William B. Barker, The Ideology of Tax Avoidance, 40 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 229, 229 (2009) (“Tax avoidance is recognized today by practically all 
governments as a serious threat to the integrity of tax systems in democratic 
societies.”); Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 
VA. TAX REV. 339, 352 (2005) (“[S]ome tax experts also worry that the highly 
publicized spread of sophisticated tax avoidance on the part of corporate and 
wealthy taxpayers undermines the average taxpayer’s respect for the system and 
thus can lead to increased noncompliance at every level.”); Stephanie Hunter 
McMahon, London Calling: Does the U.K.’s Experience with Individual Taxation 
Clash with the U.S.’s Expectations?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 159, 214 (2010) (“As 
studies . . . have shown, the perception of widespread tax avoidance often reduces 
the compliance of taxpayers who were not previously engaging in tax avoidance 
because they begin to perceive the system as unfair.”); Zoë Prebble & John 
Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 726 (2010) 
(“Both avoidance and evasion risk undermining public confidence in the tax 
system. This can give rise to a vicious circle: as confidence falls, members of the 
public become less likely voluntarily to comply with tax laws.”). 
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prohibited to engage in tax avoidance. Many corporate managers 
will argue that their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
stockholders require them to engage in tax avoidance as a means 
of achieving profit maximization.64 They either directly or 
indirectly derive this requirement from the classic corporate law 
case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,65 in which the Supreme Court of 
Michigan held that “a business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end.”66 
Some commentators have argued that the Dodge mandate 
should be rejected and ignored. For example, in Why We Should 
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, Professor Lynn A. Stout argues that 
the Dodge mandate is outdated, is not from a leading court, and is 
dicta.67 Moreover, she argues that the Dodge mandate is incorrect 
because charters and articles of incorporation allow those 
organizing the corporation to focus on more than seeking profit; 
because most state codes allow corporate managers to focus on 
more than mere wealth maximization in decision-making for the 
firm; and because subsequent case law demonstrates a weakening 
of the Dodge mandate.68 Finally, she argues that economic theory 
also calls into question whether the Dodge mandate yields a 
“well-functioning corporation.”69 She writes, “most contemporary 
experts understand that economic theory alone does not permit us 
to safely assume that corporations are run best when they are run 
according to the principle of shareholder wealth maximization.”70 
As a result, she asserts that the Dodge mandate cannot be justified 
on normative grounds.71 
                                                                                                     
 64. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining the view by some 
corporate managers and tax experts that corporations must engage in aggressive 
tax avoidance). 
 65. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 66. Id. at 684. 
 67. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166–67 (2008) (discussing “why legal experts should hesitate 
before placing much weight on Dodge v. Ford”). 
 68. See id. at 169–70. 
 69. Id. at 173. 
 70. Id. at 174. 
 71. Id. 
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While Professor Stout’s article is thoughtfully written and 
makes many valid points, the relationship of the mandate to tax 
avoidance is still worth discussing, however, because of the 
ubiquity of the Dodge mandate in classrooms, boardrooms, and 
courtrooms. As analyzed in my recent article with Professor Karie 
Davis-Nozemack, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Honoring the 
Fiduciary Duties Owed to the Corporation and Its Stockholders, 
while the Dodge mandate remains true in general because of the 
fiduciary duties undergirding it, when coupled with the business 
judgment rule, the Dodge mandate fails to require tax avoidance 
in any specific instance because of the discretion that is granted to 
corporate managers in undertaking their roles.72 
A. The Dodge Mandate 
To begin, a brief overview of the Dodge mandate ought to be 
provided, including a summary of the case from which it derives. 
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan held 
that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders.”73 In that case, the Ford Motor Co. became 
tremendously profitable and was retaining a large amount of 
money, rather than distributing it to shareholders as dividends.74 
Henry Ford dominated and controlled the board, served as 
president of the company, and owned 58% of the stock of the 
corporation.75 He declared that the company would no longer issue 
dividends to shareholders and that all future profits would be 
reinvested in the corporation.76 Two reasons were cited by the 
court for this new policy. First, in discussing this policy, Henry 
Ford was quoted by the Detroit press and by news outlets 
throughout the United States as declaring, “My ambition . . . is to 
employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial 
system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share 
                                                                                                     
 72. See generally Chaffee & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 25. 
 73. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 74. See id. at 670–71. 
 75. Id. at 671. 
 76. Id. 
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of our profits back into the business.”77 Second, the retained profits 
were also to be used to build an iron smelting plant to allow the 
company to produce its own metal parts.78 As a result of the failure 
to issue dividends and the new policies underlying them, John F. 
Dodge and Horace E. Dodge, who were stockholders of the 
company, brought suit.79 The lower court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs and held that Ford’s actions were impermissible.80 
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed in part and reversed 
in part.81 In regard to the humanitarian aspirations of the 
company, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s holding 
that they are an impermissible ground for failing to issue 
dividends.82 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Russell C. 
Ostrander stated, “A business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.”83 Simply put, a for-profit 
corporation must be run to make a profit.84 In regard to the 
smelting plant, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s 
holding. Chief Judge Ostrander wrote on behalf of the court, 
“[J]udges are not business experts. It is recognized that plans must 
often be made for a long future, for expected competition, for a 
continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture.”85 As a 
result, because a business purpose existed for the smelting plant, 
the decision to build such a plant was squarely within the 
discretion of the individuals running the corporation.86 In essence, 
the court was applying the business judgment rule.87 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 668. 
 80. Id. at 677. 
 81. Id. at 684. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (applying the business judgment rule in the decision). 
 87. Business-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The 
judicial presumption that in making business decisions not involving direct 
self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good 
faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best 
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Notably, despite the fact that the court in Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co. stated that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders,” which suggests that other 
considerations may be taken into account in making decisions for 
the corporation,88 some have suggested that the opinion stands for 
the stronger proposition that corporate management must engage 
in wealth maximization, i.e., relentless profit seeking.89 As a result 
of various limitations, which will be discussed later, the strong 
version of the Dodge mandate that demands unrelenting wealth 
maximization is likely not defensible.90 However, at minimum, a 
robust focus on generating profit is required. 
B. The Fiduciary Duties Management Owes to the Corporation 
and Its Stockholders 
Despite the recent criticism regarding the continued relevance 
of Dodge v. Ford Co., the weaker version of the Dodge mandate, 
i.e., that for-profit corporations must be run “primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders,” does remain true.91 Even though the 
Dodge mandate is outdated, is not from a leading court, and is 
dicta,92 the weaker version of the Dodge mandate is derivable from 
                                                                                                     
interest.”). 
 88. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 575 (2003) (“Dodge’s theory of 
shareholder wealth maximization has been widely accepted by courts over an 
extended period of time.”); Vincent S. J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“The managerial ideal described in Dodge and similar cases 
is that of shareholder-wealth maximization. Not every decided case is consistent 
with the rule, of course, but it is a fair approximation to say that 
shareholder-wealth maximization has been the traditional, direct aim of the duty 
of loyalty.”); Keith William Diener, The Restricted Nature of the Profit Motive: 
Perspectives from Law, Business, and Economics, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 225, 237 (2016) (“The 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case of Dodge v. 
Ford is often cited as the basis for a legal obligation to maximize shareholder 
wealth.”). 
 90. See infra Part III.C (exploring various limitations placed upon the Dodge 
mandate, including the business judgment rule, constituency statutes, and 
drafting of bylaws and articles of incorporation). 
 91. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 92. See Stout, supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Professor 
Lynn A. Stout’s criticisms of teaching Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.). 
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the fiduciary duties that corporate managers owe to the 
corporation and its stockholders. 
Although sometimes known by different names, the fiduciary 
duties management by default owes to the corporation and its 
stockholders are care, loyalty, good faith, and disclosure.93 The 
duty of care requires corporate managers to reasonably inform 
themselves of material facts prior to making decisions,94 and it 
includes the obligation to engage in basic monitoring of the 
business entity.95 It does not require that the decision that has 
                                                                                                     
 93. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending 
Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 314 (2016) 
(“Although the Delaware courts have stated that there are no other fiduciary 
duties outside of the recognized duties of care, loyalty, and perhaps good faith, 
some applications of these duties may include the duty of candor or disclosure.”); 
David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative 
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2011) (“The fiduciary duties are routinely 
described as a duty of loyalty and a duty of care—as well as duties of candor, 
disclosure, and utmost good faith.”); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is 
There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
75, 87 (2005) (“Corporate directors have a number of well-established fiduciary 
duties under state corporate law: the duties of care, loyalty and full disclosure, 
and the duty to act in good faith.”). 
 94. See Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for 
Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 
85 (2010) (“[T]he duty of care imposes an obligation on the directors of the 
corporation to inform themselves of material information prior to making any 
decision.”); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 908 (2011) (“The duty of care requires directors to be 
adequately informed in making all corporate decisions.”); Gabriel Rauterberg & 
Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Waivers: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 
1084 (2017) (“The duty of care mandates that corporate fiduciaries exercise 
informed business judgment in their stewardship of the company, imposing 
liability if a fiduciary acts (or fails to act) without first being adequately 
informed.”). 
 95. See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1164 (2014) (“Directors . . . owe a duty of care, which requires 
informed decisionmaking and some modicum of monitoring of the corporation’s 
activities.”); Julie Andersen Hill & Douglas K. Moll, The Duty of Care of Bank 
Directors and Officers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 965, 972 (2017) (“[D]irectors and officers 
are obligated to use care in monitoring the activities of the principal employees 
and the general affairs of the corporation as a whole.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & 
Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1149, 1198 (2004) (“Directors . . . may be liable for breach of the duty of 
care if they fail to properly monitor and oversee the business affairs of a 
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been made be correct or wise, and mere errors in judgment do not 
constitute a breach of the duty of care.96 The duty is procedural in 
nature,97 and a court will not look at the substance of the decision, 
unless the decision constitutes corporate waste.98 Adherence to the 
duty is judged by a gross negligence standard.99 Even so, 
                                                                                                     
corporation.”). 
 96. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and 
the Business Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 856 (2003) (“Mere errors of 
judgment and honest mistakes are insufficient as grounds for breach of the duty 
of care. . . . Traditionally, courts generally do not want to interfere with the 
corporate executives’ discretion.”); Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty 
of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1197 (2013) (“[T]he 
duty of care is a misnomer to the extent that it suggests liability for economic loss 
caused by errors in judgment. Corporation law is correct to preclude substantive 
review of good or bad risk taking . . . .”). 
 97. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the 
Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1323 (2011) (“In the context of corporate 
law, the duty of care has been rendered largely a procedural rule, rather than a 
substantive rule, in order to free directors to take calculated risks.”); Stephen 
Ellis, Grant Hayden & Cynthia Rogers, A Game Changer for the Political 
Economy of Economic Development Incentives, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 953, 976 (2014) 
(“In the corporate setting, the board of directors is subject to a legal duty of care, 
which imposes a procedural requirement that it asks the right sorts of questions 
and considers the right sorts of information when making decisions.”); Charles R. 
Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of Care 
in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 336–37 (2013) (“[C]ompliance with 
the duty of care in corporate law—at least in Delaware—is largely evaluated in 
procedural terms, i.e., did the board employ a thorough procedure?”). 
 98. See Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of 
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 77 (1993) (“[W]hen directors waste 
corporate assets they violate their duty of substantive due care . . . .”); Brett H. 
McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit 
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 43 (2014) (“The substantive side 
of the duty of care is embodied in the . . . waste standard: managers may be held 
liable for actions which are so irrational that they amount to giving away 
corporate assets.”); William O. Fisher, To Thine Own CEO Be True: Tailoring 
CEO Compensation to Individual Personality and Circumstances, 2017 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 599, 666 (2017) (“[D]uty of care prohibits extreme substantive 
decisions that cannot conceivably benefit the corporation and effectively 
constitute waste.”). 
 99. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: When 
is Falling Down on the Job a Crime?, 6 St. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 77, 93 
(2012) (“The duty of care requires boards to engage ordinary care in the processes 
by which they make decisions, and to supervise and monitor the activities of 
corporate managers; however, liability results only when the fiduciaries’ behavior 
constitutes gross negligence.”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the 
Glue of Capitalism: Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage 
Other People’s Money, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 745 (2012) (“Delaware law 
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determining what constitutes reasonably informing oneself of 
relevant information is far from a bright-line standard. As a result, 
states have enacted statutes allowing corporations to include 
provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating liability for 
breaches of the duty of care, if those organizing and owning the 
corporation decide to do so.100  
Next, the duty of loyalty requires that corporate managers not 
engage in self-dealing.101 This means that corporate managers 
                                                                                                     
has always been careful about imposing liability on corporate directors. Delaware 
states its duty of care as the avoidance of ‘gross negligence’ and uses the business 
judgment rule to reinforce the protections against personal liability for directors 
of Delaware corporations.”); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with 
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 33 (2011) (“Under 
Delaware law, which often cues the market for corporate law, the directors’ 
conduct is measured against a gross negligence standard in duty of care cases.”). 
 100. See Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s 
Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law? 
The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors, 85 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 83 (2011) (explaining that the Delaware General Corporation 
Law “allows shareholders to adopt a clause in their corporation’s articles of 
incorporation protecting directors from personal liability for monetary damages 
for breaching the duty of care. Since Delaware enacted section 102(b)(7), all other 
jurisdictions, with the exception of the District of Columbia, have enacted a 
similar provision”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
507, 531 n.52 (“Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, and 
its counterparts in other states, now allows companies to exempt directors from 
liability for money damages for breaches of the duty of care, even if the conduct 
involves gross negligence.”); Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop Here? 
Board Responsibility for FCPA Compliance, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 493, 506 (2017) 
(“Director personal liability, however, has been limited by most states, Delaware 
in particular, . . . [by corporate law statutes] providing that corporations may 
include in their articles of incorporation clauses that exculpate directors from 
monetary liability for conduct that is a breach of their duty of care.”). 
 101. See Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills & Partisans: 
Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2012) 
(“[C]orporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on corporate managers that prohibits 
them from self-dealing to the detriment of the shareholders.”); John A. Pearce II, 
The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. 
REV. 251, 270 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty requires directors to act on behalf of the 
corporation and not engage in acts that constitute self-dealing or benefiting 
improperly from their positions, to the detriment of shareholders.”); Russell C. 
Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond: 
Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 181, 185 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty prohibits a corporate director from 
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cannot use their positions to advance their own interests at the 
expense of the corporation and its stockholders.102 This requires 
that managers put the interests of the corporations and 
stockholders that they serve ahead of their own financial and other 
personal pursuits.103 Moreover, the duty requires that managers 
disclose and mitigate conflicts of interests with the corporations 
and stockholders.104 It also limits their ability to engage in 
                                                                                                     
engaging in self-dealing . . . .”). 
 102. See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1285, 1290 (2015) (“Self-dealing offends the very essence of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty applicable to corporate managers. According to that duty, 
managers must place the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders 
ahead of their personal interests.”); Avci, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 93, at 
312  (“The duty of loyalty requires that corporate officers and directors act in the 
best interest of the corporation and prioritize the interests of the corporation over 
their own self-interests.”); Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 919, 957 (2016) (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . . requires the director to place 
the interest of the corporation above her own personal interest in a transaction or 
decision.”).  
 103. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to 
Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416, 419 
(2012) (“The duty of loyalty seeks to ensure that in those situations, directors do 
not place their own interests before the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”); Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 444 (2013) (“[D]irectors owe a duty of loyalty 
to prioritize the interests of the corporation and its shareholders over their own.”); 
Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Banking Law Have Something to Teach Corporations 
Law About Directors’ Duties?, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 397, 398 (2016) (“In fulfilling 
their duty of loyalty, directors must not put their own interests, or even the 
interests of others, ahead of those of the corporation.”). 
 104. See Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: 
Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 152 
(2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interests of 
the corporation without self-dealing and to disclose the nature of any conflict of 
interest or opportunity that may confer a financial benefit upon the fiduciary that 
is unavailable to other shareholders or to the corporation.”); Phill Kline, Robert 
T. Stephan & Reid F. Holbrook, Protecting Charitable Assets in Hospital 
Conversions: An Important Role for the Attorney General, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 351, 360 (2004) (“The duty of loyalty requires corporate directors to disclose 
actual and potential conflicts of interest in business transactions and act in the 
best interests of the corporation.”); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, Fiduciary 
Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 
717 (2007) (“The duty of loyalty requires that corporate interests supersede 
personal interests, and when conflicts of interest occur, they must either be 
avoided or disclosed and approved by disinterested directors.”). 
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transactions with the corporation and limits their ability to take 
advantage of corporate opportunities.105 
In addition, the duty of good faith requires that corporate 
managers deal fairly and honestly with the corporation and its 
stockholders.106 Some courts and commentators have conceived of 
this duty as an independent fiduciary duty,107 while other courts 
and commentators have conceived of it as a subsidiary duty to the 
duty of loyalty.108 The duty of good faith is often coupled with other 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, A Corporate Governance 
Perspective on the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
303, 316 (2014) (“[T]he duty of loyalty is breached when directors divert corporate 
opportunities, assets, or information away from the corporation for their own 
personal gain.”); Ian David McClure, Accountability in the Patent Market: A Duty 
to Monitor Patent Risk from the Boardroom, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 217, 
231 (2015) (“The duty of loyalty generally arises through a conflict of interest 
created by a director that diverts corporate assets or usurps opportunities or 
information from the corporation for personal gain.”); Peter Molk, How Do LLC 
Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 524–
25 (2017) (“In addition, to a general bar on self-dealing, the duty of loyalty has 
expanded to include a prohibition on competing with the firm via one’s other 
activities as well as a prohibition against claiming corporate opportunities for 
oneself.”). 
 106. See Byron F. Egan, Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers 
in Texas, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 45, 62–63 (2009) (“The duty of good faith requires that 
directors act honestly, in the best interest of the corporation, and in a manner 
that is not knowingly unlawful or contrary to public policy.”); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 
(2006) (“The duty of good faith in corporate law is comprised of a general baseline 
conception . . . of four elements: subjective honesty, or sincerity; nonviolation of 
generally accepted standards of decency applicable to the conduct of business; 
nonviolation of generally accepted basic corporate norms; and fidelity to office.”); 
Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith 
and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2006) 
(“[D]irectors may be held personally liable for corporate misbehavior if their 
conduct evidences improper motive or ill will, a reckless disregard of known risks, 
a sustained failure to oversee management, or is so egregious that it is 
unexplainable on any other grounds other than bad faith.”). 
 107. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494 
(2004) (“[G]ood faith is a separate duty from those of care and loyalty.”); Julian 
Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1231, 1271 (2010) (“[T]he Delaware General Corporation Law provides 
support for the existence of an independent duty of good faith. Although it does 
not explicitly create the duty of good faith, neither does it explicitly create a duty 
of care or loyalty.”). 
 108. See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE 
COLLABORATION THEORY 119 
fiduciary duties to express a court’s disdain for a particular breach, 
and it is often used as a gap-filler when the other fiduciary duties 
may not easily apply.109 This is especially true when the liability 
for breaching the duty of care has been eliminated in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation.110 Because allowing 
corporations to eliminate the duty of care by placing a provision in 
their articles of incorporation is a relatively recent innovation in 
corporate law, the duty of good faith is currently in a state of flux 
and its coverage is evolving.111 
Finally, the duty of disclosure requires that corporate 
managers disclose information that is material to the operation of 
the corporation.112 Some view this duty as a subsidiary duty to the 
                                                                                                     
DAME L. REV. 1145, 1164–65 (2014) (“For a time, Delaware, the leading corporate 
law jurisdiction, flirted with an independent duty of good faith, . . . . [b]ut in Stone 
v. Ritter the court folded the duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty . . . .”); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor 
Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1074 (2011) (“Today, leading authorities 
seem to view the debate as having come to rest at the latter point: good faith in 
the corporate governance context is not a separate class of fiduciary duty, but 
instead is a subspecies of the duty of loyalty.”); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the 
New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1960 (2013) (“Part of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty is the duty to act in good faith.”). 
 109. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric 
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (“[T]he emerging duty 
of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device rather than as a substantive 
standard.”); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral 
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 
753–54 n.296 (2005) (“[B]ecause the duty of good faith is malleable, Delaware 
judges have room to shape the duty of good faith, whereas judges have less 
flexibility extending the duties of care and loyalty, the contours of which are more 
fixed by an extensive body of caselaw and recognized corporate law principles.”). 
 110. See supra note 100 (explaining that many states have adopted statutes 
allowing corporations to place provisions in their articles of incorporation 
eliminating the duty of care). 
 111. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard 
of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 525 (2006) 
(“The contours of the duty of good faith, as a fiduciary duty not subsumed within 
the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, are still evolving.”). 
 112. See James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming 
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 306–07 n.184 
(2001) (“The duty of disclosure obligates directors to provide the stockholders with 
accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate 
event that is being presented to them for action.”); Jack B. Jacobs, The Fiduciary 
Duty of Disclosure After Dabit, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 391, 395 (2007) (“A classic, 
although perhaps not complete, definition of the fiduciary duty of disclosure under 
Delaware law is that corporate directors are required to disclose all material 
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duties of care and loyalty,113 but others view it as a separate 
fiduciary duty.114 Regardless, significant portions of this duty have 
been codified within federal and state securities regulation.115 In 
                                                                                                     
information within their control when they seek stockholder action.”); Jennifer 
O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the 
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 492 (2002) (“The fiduciary duty of 
disclosure requires directors of Delaware corporations to fully and fairly disclose 
all material facts within their control when they make certain communications to 
their shareholders. Put simply, if a director makes a material misrepresentation 
to shareholders, he has potentially breached his fiduciary duty of disclosure.”).  
 113. See Kenneth R. Davis, Cash of the Titans: Arbitrating Challenges to 
Executive Compensation, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 250 (2014) (“Officers and directors 
have fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to their corporation and its 
shareholders, though courts often view the duty of good faith as a subset of the 
duty of loyalty.”); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Value Orientation and the 
Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 499 n.141 (2017) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme 
Court has described the duty of good faith as a subsidiary element or condition of 
the duty of loyalty.”); Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. 
U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 434 (2014) (“A director’s fiduciary duties include the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty, including its subsidiary component the duty of good 
faith.”). 
 114. See David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware 
Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 513 
(2004) (“Viewed as a device for interpreting contracts or other kinds of obligations, 
the duty of good faith seems not to be a subsidiary or subset of loyalty as the 
Delaware Court of Chancery would have made it. Rather, the duty to act in good 
faith is broader . . . .”); Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s 
Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 538 (2015) 
(“[M]anagers owe their businesses and investors a duty of good faith, which some 
states include as a separate fiduciary duty and some include as a part of the duty 
of care or loyalty.”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 
40 J. CORP. L. 647, 680–81 (2015) (“The duty of good faith has alternatively been 
described as one of triads of fiduciary duty and as a subset of the duty of 
loyalty . . . .”). 
 115. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, 
Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the 
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 631 
(2007) (“Although fraud fits easily enough into the duty of candor category at state 
law, most of the litigation about fraud takes place in federal court under the 
federal securities laws.”); Geoffrey Rapp, On the Liability of Corporate Directors 
to Holders of Securities for Illegal Corporate Acts: Can the Tension Between the 
“Net-Loss” and “No-Duty-to-Disclose” Rules Be Resolved, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 101, 111 (2001) (“Under federal securities laws, corporate directors have 
an affirmative duty of disclosure under certain circumstances.”); Kellye Y. Testy, 
Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1227, 1235 (2002) (“[L]arge public corporations are already under 
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regard to federal securities regulation, Justice Arthur Goldberg 
famously wrote in the majority opinion for SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc.,116 “[a] fundamental purpose . . . [of federal 
securities law] was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for 
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high 
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”117 The same 
is true of state systems of securities law.118 
The issue now becomes whether the Dodge mandate is 
derivable from these fiduciary duties, which it is.  For purposes of 
deriving the Dodge mandate, among the fiduciary duties that 
management owes to the corporation and its stockholders, the 
most important is the duty of loyalty.119 The Dodge mandate 
requires, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.”120 The duty of loyalty 
requires that corporate managers cannot use their positions to 
advance their own interests at the expense of the interests of the 
corporation and its stockholders.121 The interests of a for-profit 
corporation, although they can be altered in the articles of 
incorporation, are primarily to make a profit.122 The interests of 
                                                                                                     
substantial duties of disclosure under the federal securities laws . . . .”). 
 116. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
 117. Id. at 186.  
 118. See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How 
“Uniform” is “Uniform?”—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY 
L.J. 357, 363 n.12 (1987) (“State Blue Sky statutes . . . generally insist on full 
disclosure of all material facts as the basis for their local regulatory scheme. Many 
states, however, . . . also apply the merit standard of review to examine the 
fairness of the terms of a proposed offering.”). 
 119. See supra notes 101–105 (providing an overview of the duty of loyalty).  
 120. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 121. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (explaining the contours 
of the duty of loyalty). 
 122. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 277, 293 (2015) (“By definition, for-profit corporations exist to make 
money; otherwise they would be non-profit.”); Carol Goforth, A Corporation Has 
No Soul, and Doesn’t Go to Church: Relating the Doctrine of Piercing the Veil to 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 67 S.C. L. REV. 73, 78 (2015) (“The purpose of a for-profit 
corporation is to run a business and make a profit . . . .”); Daniel J. Morrissey, The 
Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 353, 353 (2015) (“Corporations exist primarily to make profit for their 
shareholders. This has been the black letter rule of law and the reigning 
orthodoxy of American business for a century.”); Christyne J. Vachon, Playing in 
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the shareholders are more complex. Shareholders may buy the 
stock of a corporation for a myriad of different reasons, including 
wanting to make a profit; liking the corporation’s products; liking 
the corporation’s services; liking the corporation’s politics; having 
personal or professional relationships with the individuals 
organizing, operating, or owning the corporation; or wanting for 
some other reason to be affiliated with the firm.123 This raises the 
following question: what interests of shareholders does the duty of 
loyalty protect? To answer this question, one must remember that 
the corporate form is contractual in nature.124 By purchasing stock 
in a corporation, the shareholders are agreeing to be bound 
together in a common entity that is designed to make a profit. 125 
Although shareholders may buy stock for a myriad of different 
reasons, the one that matters for purposes of determining the 
                                                                                                     
the Sandbox: Moral Development and the Duty of Care in Collaborations Between 
For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporate Persons, 33 PACE L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2013) 
(“[T]he underlying constraint on the for-profit is that law restricts its goal as a 
cooperative enterprise to . . . profit maximization for the benefit of the corporation 
and its owners.”). 
 123. See Rugger Burke & Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in the Boardroom: 
Reconsidering Fiduciary Duty Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 59, 71 (2014) (“[M]any shareholders 
invest for reasons other than just the bottom line. For example, many investors 
take a socially responsible approach by endorsing companies that share their 
values or do not invest in industries that they find to be inherently negative.”); 
Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 
1373 (2010) (“[S]ome shareholders invest with what may be characterized as 
mixed motives—they are largely concerned with financial returns, but are also 
likely, for various reasons, to support certain social causes.”). 
 124. See Michael M. Epstein & Nazgole Hashemi, Crowdfunding in 
Wonderland: Issuer and Investor Risks in Non-Fraudulent Creative Arts 
Campaigns Under the Jobs Act, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016) (“[T]he 
Contractarian theory of corporate law . . . holds that the relationship between the 
shareholders and managers of a public corporation is contractual in nature.”); 
Benjamin D. Landry, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 889, 894 (2013) (“The courts 
and the academic community have, for many years, broadly conceptualized the 
relationship between the stockholders, the board of directors, and the corporation 
as contractual in nature.”); Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of 
Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 589 
(2016) (“There is a long history of courts referring to a corporation’s constitutive 
documents as contractual in nature.”). 
 125. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of a 
for-profit corporation). 
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contours of the duty of loyalty owed by corporate managers is the 
interest in making a profit because that is the agreement that they 
made by investing in a for-profit corporation.   This means that the 
Dodge mandate is derivable from the duty of loyalty because the 
duty of loyalty requires that managers must put aside their other 
interests for purposes of seeking profit for the corporation and its 
stockholders.126 
The duties of care, good faith, and disclosure also support the 
Dodge mandate.127 Because the duty of care requires managers to 
reasonably inform themselves of material facts prior to making 
decisions,128 and because for-profit corporations exist to make a 
profit,129 corporate managers must reasonably inform themselves 
of profit-making activities and cost-reducing opportunities. 
Although the duty of care does not require that decisions be correct 
or wise,130 it forces corporate managers to focus on profit-making 
and profit-maximizing in performance of their duties, i.e., it forces 
corporate managers to focus on the Dodge mandate.131 
The relationship between the duty of good faith and the Dodge 
mandate is more difficult to define for two reasons. First, the duty 
of good faith is malleable, and its contours are difficult to define.132 
Second, the duty of good faith is evolving in the wake of state 
legislatures’ relatively recent decisions to allow corporations to 
include provisions in their articles of incorporation eliminating the 
duty of care, which has led to the duty of good faith regulating some 
of the conduct that the duty of care used to be employed to 
                                                                                                     
 126. See supra notes 101–105, 122 and accompanying text (discussing the 
duty of loyalty and the purpose of a for-profit corporation). 
 127. See supra notes 98–1040,1106–115, 1182–18 and accompanying text 
(discussing the duties of care, good faith, and disclosure).  
 128. See supra notes 98–1040 and accompanying text (describing the duty of 
care). 
 129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text (reporting that the duty of 
care does not require that corporate managers make an accurate or intelligent 
decision). 
 131. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating 
that corporations should be managed “primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders”). 
 132. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text (describing the duty of 
good faith). 
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regulate.133 With that said, the duty of good faith requires that 
corporate managers deal fairly and honestly with the corporation 
and its stockholders.134 Because the relationship among the 
corporation, its stockholders, and its managers exists for purposes 
of making a profit,135 this suggests that the duty of good faith 
requires that corporate managers adhere to the Dodge mandate as 
a consequence of the agreement struck that beget the corporation 
and allowed the investors to invest in it. 
Lastly, the duty of disclosure also helps to support the Dodge 
mandate as well. Although the duty does not directly require that 
the corporation primarily seek profit, it does require that corporate 
managers disclose information that is material to the operation of 
the corporation, especially when mandated by state and federal 
securities regulation.136 As a consequence, this creates 
transparency in the operation of the corporation that makes it 
more apparent whether managers are adhering to the Dodge 
mandate.   
C. Limitations upon the Dodge Mandate and the Lack of Clear 
Guidance in Tax Avoidance Matters 
While the Dodge mandate and the fiduciary duties from which 
it derives might seem to require corporate managers to 
unrelentingly attempt to maximize profit, various limitations on 
the mandate give managers wide latitude in how they undertake 
their functions.137 Notably, the mandate itself only requires that 
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
                                                                                                     
 133. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text (explaining that the duty 
of good faith is evolving because many states allow corporations to draft articles 
of incorporation in ways that eliminate the duty of care, which creates questions 
as to whether the duty of good faith might cover some of the behavior that the 
duty of care previously covered).  
 134. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text (describing the duty of 
good faith). 
 135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra note 112–18 and accompanying text (exploring the duty of 
disclosure). 
 137. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
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the profit of the stockholders.”138 The word “primarily” suggests 
that other interests may be considered.139 These other interests 
could be included in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. Even if 
they are not, many jurisdictions have adopted constituency 
statutes that allow corporate managers to consider a much wider 
range of interests of other constituencies—such as creditors, 
employees, customers, and the general public—beyond the 
interests of stockholders in making profits.140 In addition, 
corporate managers can also seek stockholder approval or 
ratification in the event that they are pursuing courses of action 
that might be an affront to the Dodge mandate.141 
                                                                                                     
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See ALA. CODE § 10A-2-11.03(c) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 10-830(D), 10-2702 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1202(c) (2017); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 7-106-105(7) (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(g) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. 
§ 607.0830(3) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (West 2018); IDAHO CODE 
§ 30-1702 (2017); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2017); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) 
(2017); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 
2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C § 831(6) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2017); 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2017); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-815(3) (2017); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 78.138(4) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:12.02(c) (2017); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2018); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-03(c) (2017); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (West 
2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2017); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (2017); 7 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.2-8(a) (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-103(c) 
(2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 47-33-4 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 
(2017); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.401 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 16-10a-840(5), 16-10a-1103(3) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) 
(2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(B) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.11.030(3) 
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2017); see 
also Burke & Bragg, supra note 123, at 68 n.34 (“Constituency statutes, also 
known as stakeholder statutes, permit a board of directors to consider an 
enumerated list of constituent (i.e., primary stakeholder) interests as well as 
shareholder interests when making business decisions.”). But see William H. 
Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the 
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 830–31 (2012) 
(“Conspicuously absent from the list of states adopting constituency statutes is 
Delaware, where more than 900,000 business entities have their legal home, 
including more than fifty percent of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 
sixty-three percent of the Fortune 500 companies.”). 
 141. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. 
L. 239, 249 (2009) (“Activity that would otherwise constitute a breach of the duty 
of loyalty can be cured or ratified by approval from a majority of disinterested 
directors or a majority of disinterested shareholders.”); J. Travis Laster, The 
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However, the most important limitation on the Dodge 
mandate is the business judgment rule, which gives corporate 
managers broad discretion in making business decisions.142 The 
business judgment rule exists because courts do not wish to spend 
their time second-guessing corporate managers.143 Judges 
frequently have limited experience with making business 
decisions, and managers know their corporations’ operations and 
the environments in which they exist better than a court 
                                                                                                     
Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1443, 1459 (2014) (“If the board makes a business decision on an issue within its 
authority and submits the matter to the stockholders for a voluntary 
vote, . . . then the resulting stockholder approval . . . causes the business 
judgment rule to protect the board’s decision . . . .”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians 
as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 703 (2013) (“[C]orporate law provides two 
primary safe harbor options for cleansing the taint of interested director 
transactions: (1) approval by a majority of the disinterested directors or 
(2) ratification through a fully informed vote by a majority of the disinterested 
shareholders.”). 
 142. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 513, 581–82 (2015) (“[D]irectors have substantial freedom to make 
decisions in the public interest. The business judgment rule means that courts 
will refuse to second guess directors’ substantive business decisions, barring 
conflicts of interest, corporate waste, or egregious procedural impropriety.”); Chad 
J. Pomeroy, Well Enough Alone: Liability for Wrongful Foreclosure, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 943, 960 (2017) (“The business judgment rule is, essentially, a presumption 
of correctitude reflecting the judiciary’s hesitance to second-guess the risk-taking 
decisions of corporate officers and directors.”); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side 
Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2013 (2013) (“[T]he 
business judgment rule gives boards legal discretion at any time to increase 
employee salaries and benefits, treat suppliers more generously, retain earnings 
to give creditors a larger ‘equity cushion,’ or decline to pursue aggressive 
tax-avoidance strategies.”). 
 143. See Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor 
Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773, 1782 (2013) (“[U]nder the business judgment 
rule, a court will not second-guess a board judgment if the board was informed, 
independent, disinterested, and acted in good faith.”); Justin Blount & Patricia 
Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate Governance 
Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 238 (2015) (“Through the business judgment rule, 
officers and directors can direct the affairs of the corporation the best they are 
able, without the fear that courts will second guess the difficult decisions they 
must make.”); David G. Yosifon, The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate 
Law and the Meaning of Consumer Culture, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1309, 1342 
(“Adhering to the “business judgment rule,” courts do not second-guess the 
substance of business decisions that boards make.”). 
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adjudicating a matter.144 Often, business decisions are complex 
and do not have a single correct answer, which makes determining 
whether a decision was providently made difficult.145 In addition, 
the business judgment rule allows corporate managers to pursue 
more aggressive courses of action that help to fuel economic 
growth.146 
To take advantage of business judgment rule, all the manager 
has to do is to articulate any business purpose for the decision.147 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward 
Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 197 
n.104 (2010) (“The business judgment rule is based on the presumption that 
directors possess more expertise than judges when it comes to making business 
decisions and so should not be second-guessed by judges as long as appropriate 
procedures have been followed in the decision-making process.”); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
973, 996 (2002) (“Given courts’ limited information, expertise, and resources, the 
business judgment rule rightly counsels courts against substantive review of the 
merits of board decisions.”); Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, 
Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector, 
77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 304 (2016) (“The business judgment rule is also based on 
the premise that directors have more expertise than courts and that investors 
prefer business decisions in the board room instead of the courtroom.”). 
 145. See Davis, supra note 113, at 270 (“One rationale for the business 
judgment rule is that judges may lack the expertise to evaluate complex business 
decisions.”); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition 
Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 855 (2011) (“The business judgment rule rests 
largely on the presumption that directors (business professionals)—rather than 
courts—boast the business acumen required to sufficiently assess the economic 
risk associated with their often complex decisions.”).  
 146. See Aaron Brumbaugh, The Business Judgement Rule and the 
Diversified Investor: Encouraging Risk in Financial Institutions, 17 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 171, 174 (2017) (“The Business Judgment Rule offers decision makers a 
safeguard from liability associated with the possible poor outcomes of those risky 
decisions, which . . . encourages the decision makers to be less averse to 
risk . . . and aim for the returns that diversified shareholders want.”); Alex 
Devience, Jr., A Hindsight Review of the Business Judgment Rule in a Takeover 
Environment: The State of the Business Judgment Rule After the Fall, 5 DEPAUL 
BUS. L.J. 113, 135 (1992) (“The business judgment rule is a judicial principle that 
attempts to balance a corporation’s need for honest governance with its need for 
aggressive managers who may make imprudent judgments in the general 
management scheme.”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 223 n.155 (2013) (“The business judgment rule helps 
support . . . risk-preferring strategy in individual companies, as it absolves 
corporate boards from fear that aggressive, unorthodox decision-making will be 
second-guessed if it goes wrong.”). 
 147. See Blount & Nunley, supra note 143, at 306 (“[T]he business judgment 
rule . . . insulates directors and officers from liability in carrying on the business 
of the organization as long as their decisions are made in good faith and 
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In Dodge v. Ford, for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan held 
that the Ford Motor Company’s retention of profits to build an iron 
smelting plant to allow the company to produce its own metal parts 
was acceptable because of the business judgment rule.148 
In tax strategy matters, courts have given corporate managers 
the benefit of the business judgment presumption to defeat claims 
of breach of fiduciary duty. Kamin v. American Express Co.149 offers 
one classic example of a court issuing such a holding.150 In that 
case, two minority stockholders of American Express Company 
brought a derivative suit against the directors of the corporation 
based upon the board’s decision to issue a special dividend, rather 
than pursuing a course of action that would have a tax benefit.151 
In 1972, American Express had acquired 1,954,418 shares of 
Donaldson, Lufken and Jenrette, Inc. (DLJ) for investment at a 
cost of $29.9 million.152 The market value of company at the time 
of the court’s opinion had declined to $4 million.153 On July 28, 
1975, the board declared that the stockholders of American 
Express would receive the DLJ shares as a special dividend.154 The 
plaintiffs contended that American Express should have sold the 
                                                                                                     
attributable to a rational business purpose.”); Julie Andersen Hill & Douglas K. 
Moll, The Duty of Care of Bank Directors and Officers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 965, 978 
(2017) (“The business judgment rule is an especially deferential standard of 
review that insulates directors and officers from liability for a poor decision so 
long as the decision can be attributed to a rational business purpose.”); 
Westbrook, supra note 103, at 399 (“[C]ourts refrain from second-guessing board 
decisions after the fact unless it is shown that the decision was uninformed, did 
not serve a rational business purpose, was made by directors with a personal 
interest in the decision, or was made by directors who were not 
independent . . . .”). 
 148. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[J]udges 
are not business experts. It is recognized that plans must often be made for a long 
future, for expected competition, for a continuing as well as an immediately 
profitable venture.”). 
 149. 86 Misc.2d 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).  
 150. Id. at 813.  
 151. Id. at 810. 
 152. Id. at 811. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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shares at a capital loss of $25 million to offset capital gains on other 
investments.155 
The Supreme Court of New York held that the directors’ 
decision was protected by the business judgment presumption 
because no evidence was presented of fraud, self-dealing, bad faith, 
or oppressive conduct.156 Writing for the court, Justice Edward J. 
Greenfield stated, “[a] complaint which alleges merely that some 
course of action other than that pursued by the board of directors 
would have been more advantageous gives rise to no cognizable 
cause of action.”157 He continued, “[t]he directors’ room rather than 
the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely 
business questions which will have an impact on profits, market 
prices, competitive situations, or tax advantages.”158 The court also 
stated that it did not matter if the directors acted “imprudently” as 
long as they acted in good faith.159 Importantly, he did 
acknowledge, “[a]ll directors have an obligation, using sound 
business judgment, to maximize income for the benefit of all 
persons having a stake in the welfare of the corporate entity.”160 
However, the court will not interfere in the absence of “a clear 
case . . . of fraud, oppression, arbitrary action, or breach of 
trust.”161 In short, the decision to engage in tax avoidance remains 
within the discretion of the board.162  
In recent opinions, Delaware courts have continued this 
tradition of employing the business judgment presumption to give 
corporate managers broad discretion in determining tax strategy. 
In Freedman v. Adams,163 the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed 
a decision of the Court of Chancery of Delaware and held that tax 
strategy decisions represent “a classic exercise of business 
judgment.”164 In that case, Susan Freedman, a stockholder of XTO 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 815. 
 157. Id. at 812. 
 158. Id. at 812–13. 
 159. Id. at 813. 
 160. Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1976). 
 161. Id. at 815. 
 162. Id. 
 163. 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013).  
 164. Id. at 417.  
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Energy Inc., brought a derivative suit that alleged the board of 
directors had committed waste by adopting an executive bonus 
plan that failed to make its payments tax deductible under the 
Internal Revenue Code.165 She alleged that a plan could have been 
fashioned that this would have resulted in an approximately $40 
million savings for the corporation.166 The court held that the 
business judgment presumption protected the board, even if their 
decision was a bad one, because the board should have flexibility 
in making tax strategy determinations.167 
In addition to that case, the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
also addressed the application of the business judgment 
presumption to tax strategy decisions in Seinfeld v. Slager.168 In 
that case, Frank Seinfeld, a stockholder of Republic Services, Inc., 
brought a derivative suit against members of the board of directors 
relating to the corporation’s compensation decisions.169 
Specifically, he asserted that various compensation to be paid was 
waste because it was not tax deductible under § 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code.170 As characterized by the court, Seinfeld 
was claiming that “there is an independent duty to minimize taxes, 
or alternatively that the failure to minimize taxes is per se a waste 
of corporate assets.”171 Although the court was unwilling to state 
that the decision to pursue or forgo tax savings is never a breach 
of fiduciary duty, the court held, “a decision to pursue or forgo tax 
savings is generally a business decision for the board of 
directors.”172 The court was willing to hold unequivocally that 
“there is no separate duty to minimize taxes, and a failure to do so 
is not automatically a waste of corporate assets.”173 As a 
consequence, corporate managers have broad discretion in how 
they formulate tax strategies, and while true in general, the Dodge 
                                                                                                     
 165. Id. at 416–17. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 417. 
 168. No. 6462–VCG, 2012 WL 2501105 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012). 
 169. Id. at *1. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at *3. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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mandate provides very little guidance as to what tax strategy 
should be pursued in any particular situation.  
IV. Essentialist Theories of the Corporation 
In the search for guidance on the acceptability of tax 
avoidance, Professor Karie Davis-Nozemack and I have argued 
elsewhere that at least in part social science theories from fields 
such as corporate social responsibility, business ethics, and 
economics should be used to fill the void.174 Still, while such 
theories may provide some direction in filling in the gaps, one must 
wonder whether the law offers any other binding mandates on 
corporate managers. One place to look is the essential nature of 
the corporate form itself.  Because the corporation is at least in part 
a legal construct, understanding the nature of the form helps to 
explain the legal requirements placed upon its managers.175 
To begin, a few brief words ought to be said about the history 
of the corporate form as a precursor to exploring the prevailing 
essentialist theories of the corporation because it will help to 
explain how these theories developed. Although the ancestors of 
modern corporations are found in a variety of cultures, one obvious 
place to start is ancient Rome because the term “corporation” 
derives from the Latin term “corpus” which means “body of the 
people.”176 In ancient Rome, the state recognized various entities 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Chaffee & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 25, at 1473–80 (discussing 
various social science fields that may be helpful to corporate managers in 
addressing corporate tax avoidance decision-making). 
 175. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 1951, 1952 (2018) (“[C]orporations are wealth-producing socioeconomic 
legal constructs that should profit shareholders . . . .”); Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic 
Decision- Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 142–43 (2017) (“Corporations are 
legal constructs intended to maximize profit and shareholder value.”); Felix T. 
Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2014 (2017) 
(“[C]orporations are legal constructs to which legal rights or duties can attach, 
just as they can to individuals.”). 
 176. See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1161 n.126 
(2012) (“The etymology of the word ‘corporation’ comes from the Latin ‘corpus,’ 
which means ‘body,’ as in a ‘corps’ or group of people.”); Michael J. Kelly, “Never 
Again”? German Chemical Corporation Complicity in the Kurdish Genocide, 31 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 348, 350 (2013) (“From the Latin corpus for body, 
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that had a separate identity from the people who composed them, 
and in addition to being referred to by the term “corpus,” these 
organizations were referred to by other names, including 
“collegium” and “universitas.”177 These entities had strong ties to 
the communities in which they existed and were organized for 
social purposes such as asylums, burial societies, homes for the 
poor, homes for the aged, hospitals, orphanages, political clubs, 
and religious societies.178 These entities even included 
municipalities and the Roman state itself.179 
The attributes of the modern corporation developed over time. 
During the thirteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church played 
a major role in this development when Sinibaldo Fieschi, who went 
on to become Pope Innocent IV, developed the concept of persona 
ficta, which entailed the idea of fictitious legal personhood for 
non-corporeal entities.180 During the Middle Ages, England began 
                                                                                                     
corporations have been around since Roman times.”). 
 177. See Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 509, 517, 529 n.93 (2011) (“In addition to universitas, the corporation was 
also referred to by the words, corpus (body) and collegium (college).”); Ian D. 
McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for Patents: 
Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 759, 
765– 66 (2015) (“In the early sixth century, Roman law recognized various types 
of municipal-led, political or religious-focused corporations under the names 
universitas, corpus, or collegium.”); Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent vs. Work 
Made for Hire: Resolving the Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate 
Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 
(2012) (“The term and concept ‘corporation’ derived from the universitas, corpus, 
and collegium of Roman law.”). 
 178. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 216 (1983) (reporting that in ancient Rome, “many 
private associations, including organizations for maintaining a religious cult, 
burial clubs, political clubs, and guilds of craftsmen or traders, were considered 
to be corporations”). 
 179. See id. at 215 (discussing the origins of the corporate form in ancient 
Roman law); Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and Many: Individual Rights, Corporate 
Rights and the Diversity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 807 (2005) (“Corporate 
entities, including municipalities, trade guilds and burial societies, were known 
in Roman law from the earliest times.”). 
 180. See Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Availability of Parish Assets for Diocesan 
Debts: A Canonical Analysis, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361, 362 (2005) (“The 
Canon law of the Roman Catholic Church was the first legal system in the world 
to develop the notion of a fictitious legal personality. . . . [T]he term persona 
ficta . . . [was] actually used for the first time . . . by . . . , Sinibaldo Fieschi in the 
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allowing the creation of corporations for charitable purposes,181 
and the English government started to recognize perpetual 
existence for incorporated ecclesiastical, municipal, and charitable 
entities.182 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
English government chartered corporations to develop newly 
conquered lands and began creating corporations for overseas 
trading, which popularized private stock ownership of 
corporations.183 Throughout this period, the Crown and later 
Parliament retained exclusive power to grant corporate charters 
                                                                                                     
mid-thirteenth century.”); Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate 
Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225, 239 (2012) (“Pope Innocent IV is generally 
credited with the first articulation of the ‘legal fiction’ view of the corporation for 
his description of ecclesiastical bodies as both distinct entities as a matter of social 
fact, yet spiritually personae fictae—lacking a body or will and thus not 
susceptible of excommunication.”); Mary Szto, Limited Liability Morality: 
Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 109 (2004) 
(“Canon law . . . influenced the development of the corporation . . . . Sinibaldo 
Fieschi, also known as Sinibaldus Fliscus, is known as the father of modern 
corporations theory. In the thirteenth century he wrote about ‘persona ficta,’ 
which led to the notion of ‘legal persons.’”). 
 181. See Blair, supra note 31, at 789 (“The earliest corporations were not 
organized for business purposes. Corporate law as we know it today evolved out 
of laws and practices governing municipalities, churches, and religious 
institutions in Europe during the Middle Ages.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas 
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United 
with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 891 (2016) (“The first 
corporations chartered in Europe in the Middle Ages were not business 
corporations. Rather, they were religious, municipal, and benevolent 
corporations.”).  
 182. See ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS 7 (6th ed. 2009) (offering a 
historical overview of corporations). 
 183. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End 
of History or a Never-Ending Story, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 481 (2011) (“Today’s 
corporations derive from the English and continental European joint-stock 
companies formed late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth centuries to 
engage in trade with the Far East.”); Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and 
Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1387, 1408 (2014) (“European 
nations . . . outsourced empire to business enterprises. An important predecessor 
of the modern business corporation was the joint stock company, which flourished 
with European exploration, trade, and expansion in the seventeenth century.”); 
Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at 1632 (“By the late 
sixteenth century, several European countries had begun chartering corporations 
to develop foreign trade and colonies. Some of these early corporations, such as 
the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company, became well-known 
players in American colonial times.”). 
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and create corporations, which meant corporations could only be 
formed through the direct action of the government.184 
During the colonial period and early days of the United States, 
corporations could still only be created by specific act of the 
government. In practice, this meant that corporations were 
bespoke entities brought to life through bills passed by state 
legislatures and signed by state governors, and any alteration to a 
corporation’s charter had to occur through a similar process.185 As 
a result, a relatively small number of corporations existed during 
this period and most served relatively public functions, such as 
building and operating canals, bridges, and roads or operating 
banks or insurance companies, and state legislatures regularly 
granted corporate charters to noncommercial associations, such as 
charities, churches, and universities.186 During the nineteenth 
                                                                                                     
 184. See Ryan Bubb, Choosing the Partnership: English Business 
Organization Law During the Industrial Revolution, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 
340 (2015) (“Until 1844, [in England,] corporations could only be formed by an act 
of Parliament or a charter granted by the Crown.”); Beth Stephens, The Amorality 
of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
45, 55 (2002) (“Until well into the nineteenth century, corporations could be 
formed only by an act of the government—the king or Parliament in England, or 
the state legislatures in the United States.”). 
 185. See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding 
the Corporate “Conscience”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) (“The earliest 
forms of the corporation in America came by specific charters from the states in 
the late eighteenth century, which were carried-over from the colonial days when 
corporations obtained charters directly from the King of England.”); Celia R. 
Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers 
Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 997 
(2006) (“This conceptualization of the corporation clearly gave strong regulatory 
control to states through their exclusive and individualized charter authority. 
State legislatures, carrying on the work of the colonial assemblies, issued special 
charters conferring limited rights to corporations.”); Christopher J. Wolfe, “An 
Artificial Being”: John Marshall and Corporate Personhood, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 201, 204 (2017) (“Initially, colonial governments were granted this power 
by the King’s agents; after the colonies broke away and created new state 
governments, the power to create corporate persons was considered part of the 
sovereign power of the state governments.”). 
 186. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L. REV. 27, 42 (1998) (“[T]he earliest corporations were 
formed only upon the grant of a special charter by the crown, or in the early 
United States, by state charter, and these charters nearly always specified some 
sort of public purpose.”); Stefan J. Padfield, In Search of a Higher Standard: 
Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 
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century, states began to adopt general incorporation statutes, 
which allowed private individuals to form corporations without 
seeking an act of the state legislature, as Americans began to 
embrace competition, markets, and industrialization.187 The 
modern corporation quickly came to dominate business in the 
United States.188 
As will be explained below, throughout the history of the 
United States, three prevailing theories of the corporation were 
developed, i.e., artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and 
                                                                                                     
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 87 (2004) (“[I]n the colonial United States, the 
responsibility for granting charters fell to the legislature. These charters were 
initially granted primarily to further various public works projects and, like in 
England, were handed out on a case-by-case basis.”); Ann M. Scarlett, 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical and Normative Foundations, 61 
BUFF. L. REV. 837, 899–900 (2013) (“In colonial times, corporations were created 
by royal charters just as they were in England, and only local public service 
corporations were well represented.”). 
 187. See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the 
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1071 
(2013) (“It was not until the development of general incorporation laws, beginning 
in the mid-nineteenth century, that corporate law in the United States ceased to 
be a field of special grants of privilege to a few individuals.”); Henry Hansmann 
& Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation 
of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 993–94 (2014) (“[G]eneral 
incorporation laws, which allowed firms to incorporate without the need to obtain 
special legislative charters and conferred no exclusive privileges, gradually 
became dominant after the mid-nineteenth century; by the end of the century, 
they were the typical basis for incorporation . . . .”); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 647 (2016) (“Over the 
course of the nineteenth century, states moved from a system of exclusively 
granting charters by discretionary special acts of the legislature to a system in 
which . . . businesses could seek a corporate charter without specific involvement 
of the legislature.”). 
 188. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
253, 256 (2005) (“[T]he corporation has evolved into the dominant business form 
for pursuing certain kinds of large, long-term economic projects.”); Kevin M. 
Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern 
Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 119 (1992) (“Corporations grew in 
importance in the 1860s and became the dominant business form in the 1880s 
and 1890s . . . .”); Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic 
Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height 
of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 313 (2013) (“[B]y late in the 
nineteenth century the corporate form was a commonplace frame for business 
organizations, its adoption made easy by the passage of general incorporation 
statutes during the century, and giant corporations had become an increasingly 
common feature of the economic landscape, beginning with the railroads.”). 
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aggregate theory.189 At one time or another, each of these theories 
was dominant.190 However, as will also be explained below, 
although each of these theories has its attractiveness, none of them 
fully define what a corporation is. As a result, some have advocated 
for embracing the indeterminacy of the corporation by embracing 
all of the theories at once, despite conceptual inconsistencies.191 
Each of the prevailing theories of the corporation will be examined 
below, and this will set the stage for a discussion of my theory of 
the corporation—collaboration theory. 
A. Artificial Entity Theory 
Artificial entity theory, which is also referred to as concession 
theory, asserts that corporations are artificial entities that owe 
their existence completely to a concession by the government, i.e., 
a government grant of specific rights and privileges.192 The 
government creates these entities to achieve goals that it does not 
have time, money, or other resources to achieve.193 Under this 
                                                                                                     
 189. See infra Parts IV.A–C (exploring the prevailing essentialist theories of 
the corporation, i.e., artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and aggregate 
theory). 
 190. See infra notes 197, 206, 211 and accompanying text. 
 191. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the claim that the best course of action 
in determining the essential nature of the corporation is to embrace its 
indeterminacy by embracing all of the prevailing essentialist theories of the 
corporation, despite the logical inconsistencies created by such an approach). 
 192. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational 
Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 506–07 (2016) (“‘[A]rtificial entity’ or 
‘concession’ theory . . . focuses on the sense in which the corporation owes its very 
existence to the state’s largesse.”); Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 891–92 (“[T]he 
concession or ‘artificial entity’ theory . . . sees the corporation as a creation of the 
state or sovereign that grants its charter . . . .”); David Min, Corporate Political 
Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. REG. 423, 442 n.83 (2016) 
(“For much of its history, the corporation was understood as an organizational 
form that was granted by the state and which owed its existence to the state.”). 
 193. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 54, at 12 (“Under the artificial entity view, 
the corporation owes its existence to the state and is granted certain privileges in 
order to be able to fulfill functions that the state would like to achieve.”); Nathan 
Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New 
Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 115 (2005) (“The concession theory 
claims that the corporation is a creation of the state that exercises delegated 
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theory, the corporation’s rights and obligations are defined by the 
government that provided for its existence.194 As a result, the 
government retains the power to define the scope of corporate 
activity, regulate corporate behavior, and punish corporations that 
fall short of the government’s mandates.195 
Artificial entity is the original conception of the corporation. 
As previously discussed, corporations originally could be created 
only through an act of the government, and this tradition was 
carried on from medieval England throughout the early days of the 
United States.196 As a consequence, artificial entity theory was 
dominant during this period.197 This dominance was so pronounced 
                                                                                                     
authority to serve the purposes of the government . . . .”); Padfield, Rehabilitating 
Concession Theory, supra note 31, at 332 (“[T]he concession theory of the . . . views 
the corporation as a tremendous capital accumulation device that was only made 
possible by the state conveying certain privileges to incorporators . . . [to] achieve 
goals that might otherwise fail for lack of funding.”). 
 194. See Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 737 (2011) (“This ‘artificial person’ or ‘concession’ theory 
rested on the view that a corporation effectively exists at the sufferance of the 
state and, therefore, is not entitled to any rights or protections not granted to it 
by statute.”); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come With Responsibilities: Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 136 
(2013) (“[C]orporations under the artificial entity framework had no political 
rights as they were conceived as purely economic entities, created by the state 
and subject to significant control and regulation.”); J. Janewa OseiTutu, 
Corporate “Human Rights” to Intellectual Property Protection?, 55 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1, 42 (2015) (“[T]he concession theory postulates that corporations are 
created by the state and have only the rights that are granted to them by the 
state.”). 
 195. See Carliss N. Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The 
Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice Following Citizens United, 105 KY. L.J. 
49, 58 n.48 (2016) (“The artificial entity theory envisions corporations as state 
approved entities, which exist at the pleasure of the government, are 
non-corporeal, and may be subject to more extensive regulation than a natural 
person due to this privileged position.”); John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover 
Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
806, 828 (1989) (“Under a pure artificial entity theory, a corporation can be 
regulated in any manner the state desires.”); Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession 
Theory, supra note 31, at 333 (“Under concession theory, the state retains 
significant presumptive authority to regulate the corporate entity in exchange for 
granting this bundle of rights to incorporators.”). 
 196. See supra notes 184–85 (discussing how corporations were formed in 
England, colonial America, and during the early days of the United States). 
 197. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A 
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 54 (2009) (“The artificial 
entity theory dominated the first part of the 1800s.”); Jess M. Krannich, The 
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that in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,198 the 
Supreme Court of the United States explicitly adopted artificial 
entity theory.199 Writing on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice John 
Marshall stated: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature 
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of 
its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to 
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best 
calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among 
the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may 
be allowed, individuality; properties by which a perpetual 
succession of many persons are considered as the same, and 
may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to 
manage its own affairs and to hold property without the 
perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of 
perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from 
hand to hand.200 
Although proponents of artificial entity still exist today, the 
Court’s holding likely represents the point of artificial entity 
theory’s greatest popularity. 
With the advent of general incorporation statutes in the early 
and mid-1800s, the popularity of the artificial entity theory waned 
as the role of state governments in forming corporations was 
                                                                                                     
Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 71 (2005) (“The artificial 
entity metaphor remained the dominant view of the corporate entity through 
much of the nineteenth century, and it remains prevalent in corporate theory as 
well as constitutional law today.”); Marcantel, supra note 31, at 225 (“[I]t is 
unequivocal that concessionary theory was a dominant theory in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”). 
 198. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 199. See id. at 636 (explaining the form and function of the corporate entity 
in the United States). 
 200. Id. 
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reduced.201 As a result, many corporate law theorists began to 
re-conceptualize the corporation as a real entity.202 
B. Real Entity Theory 
Real entity theory, which is also known as natural entity 
theory, is another prevailing essentialist theory of the corporation. 
Real entity theory posits that the corporation is an entity separate 
and apart from the individuals organizing, owning, and operating 
it.203 Unlike artificial entity theory, real entity theory suggests that 
the corporation does not owe its existence to the state, but it is a 
product of the group identity of the individuals organizing, owning, 
                                                                                                     
 201. See Colombo, supra note 31, at 11 (“General incorporation statutes 
sounded the death knell of concession theory—the notion that corporations are 
creations of the state.”); Ripken, supra note 31, at 220 (“By the mid-nineteenth 
century, special chartering gave way to general incorporation statutes. . . . The 
idea that corporations existed only because of the concession of the state held far 
less force . . . .”); Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large 
Multinational Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 107, 130–31 (2007) 
(“Changes in law and business practice in the early twentieth century changed 
the understanding of the corporation from a state-chartered entity towards a view 
that understood the corporation as a ‘natural entity’ established by the 
incorporators and shareholders, with only minimal state involvement.”). 
 202. See Nicole Bremner Càsarez, Corruption, Corrosion, and Corporate 
Political Speech, 70 NEB. L. REV. 689, 718–19 (1991) (“Philosophical questions 
about the nature of corporations had fascinated German and French political 
thinkers during the nineteenth century. Otto von Gierke, in particular, advanced 
the idea that groups (and, therefore, corporations) are natural extensions of 
human society.”); Anthony W. Kraus, Absolute Protection for Intracorporate 
Personnel Communications Under Defamation Law: A Philosophical Reappraisal 
of the Nonpublication Doctrine, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 155, 171 (1994) (“Attention to 
the subject of corporate legal status increased greatly in Europe during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. The fictive view of corporations was rejected by 
the leading German scholar of the time, Otto von Gierke.”); Michalski, supra note 
31, at 136 (“Beginning in the late nineteenth century, natural entity theory 
replaced the conception of the corporation as an artificial creation of state law.”). 
 203. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the 
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 59 (1990) (“[T]he real or natural entity 
theory of corporations held that the corporation was an entity separate from its 
members.”); Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at 
1641– 42 (“Also known as the natural entity or person theory, [the real entity 
theory] regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate existence from 
its shareholders and from the state.”); Sloan G. Speck, The Social Boundaries of 
Corporate Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2583, 2591 (2016) (“[T]he ‘real entity’ 
theory treats corporations as distinct legal persons with specific rights and 
obligations not linked to those of their owners.”). 
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and operating the business form.204 As a result of this collective 
personality, some proponents of this theory suggest that the 
corporation possesses human rights that emerge from the separate 
identity of the group.205 
Although advocates for real entity theory have existed 
throughout the history of the United States and even today, real 
entity theory was the dominant essentialist theory of the 
corporation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century 
and much of the twentieth century.206 As a result of the widespread 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of 
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 580 (1989) (“The 
real entity paradigm implied that corporations owe their existence and legitimacy 
to the distinct and unified purposes and wills of groups.”); Teemu Ruskola, What 
Is a Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise 
Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood), 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639, 
659 (2014) (discussing “the views of late nineteenth-century ‘real entity’ theorists 
for whom the corporation was effectively a kind of super-person, a metaphysically 
real entity in its own right, the existence of which preceded law whose main task 
was merely to declare its social existence”); Kenya J.H. Smith, Incomplete 
Sentences: Hobby Lobby’s Corporate Religious Rights, the Criminally Culpable 
Corporate Soul, and the Case for Greater Alignment of Organizational and 
Individual Sentencing, 77 LA. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2016) (“[T]he real entity 
theory . . . embraces the explanation of corporations as a natural consequence of 
group dynamics, analogous to a family, religious congregation, or other types of 
assemblies formed by groups of natural persons.”). 
 205. See Marcantel, supra note 31, at 222 n.7 (“In the constitutional sense, 
real entity theory posits that the corporation, as an entity, is entitled to 
constitutional protection independent of its shareholders.”); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, 
Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 63, 84 (2009) (“Natural entity theory described corporations as 
separate entities, distinct from their individual members and having real 
existence, with rights and liabilities similar to those of persons (specifically, 
constitutional rights and criminal and tort liabilities).”); Seema Mohapatra, Time 
to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law to 
Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137, 162 (2015) (“The 
real entity theory suggests that as a corporation is separate and apart, the 
corporation has a ‘collective consciousness’ that is separate and apart from those 
who manage its operations. Therefore, it is said that a corporation may then be 
considered a person under the law and entitled to legal rights that would 
naturally flow to any person.”). 
 206. See Krannich, supra note 197, at 85 (“[T]he real entity theory became the 
most prominent definition of the corporate ‘person’ in the early twentieth 
century.”); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the 
Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1994) (“The . . . real entity theory 
of the corporation, also known as natural-entity theory, was influential from the 
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adoption of general incorporation statutes during the 1800s, 
corporate theorists’ focus on the role of the state lessened, and they 
searched for a new answer to the metaphysical question of what is 
the essential nature of the corporation.207 Ultimately, they looked 
to European corporate legal theorists in their search, and 
specifically, the work of German legal theorist Otto von Gierke, 
who suggested that groups of individuals take on a separate 
“collective spirit” from the individuals that compose them, which 
he believed applied to corporations as well.208 American corporate 
law theorists imported this idea to the United States.209 
                                                                                                     
end of the [nineteenth] century until at least the 1920s.”); Susanna Kim Ripken, 
Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate 
Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 112 (2009) (“At the turn of 
the 20th Century, the real entity, or natural entity theory became the popular 
way of describing the corporate person.”). 
 207. See supra notes 205–02 and accompanying text (discussing the transition 
from artificial entity theory to real entity theory as the dominant essentialist 
theory of the corporation). 
 208. See Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To 
Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1089 n.112  
(“In German law, the name of Otto von Gierke is typically associated with the 
‘entity’ theory of the corporation. Gierke understood legal personality as the 
reflection of social reality and argued that individuals would form fellowships that 
developed an autonomous existence necessary for their social fulfillment.”); 
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 80 (“Otto von Gierke and Frederic Maitland are two of 
the most notable thinkers who advanced the position that group agents are 
emergent entities. According to them, a collective consciousness springs forth 
from the associations of individuals within corporations.”); Oman, supra note 193, 
at 116 (“The real theory of the corporation received its most forceful statement in 
German legal thought. . . . Otto Gierke became the proponent of this approach in 
the context of corporate law.”). 
 209. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2132 (2016) (“[T]he ‘real entity’ theory [is] a late 
nineteenth-century theory exported from Germany to England and the United 
States as a basis for the legal rights of business organizations.”); Ron Harris, The 
Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From 
German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1422–23 (2006) (“The German-Gierkian real entity 
theory of the corporation journeyed through several contexts and discourses in 
Britain and the United States. It inspired numerous articles and books in English, 
French and German.”); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization and the 
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 40 (2005) (“Under the 
influence of German theorists who suggested that corporate legal personality 
translated the corporation’s existence as a real entity separate from its 
shareholders, the corporation came increasingly to be viewed as an institution in 
its own right, rather than as the shareholders in special form.”). 
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C. Aggregate Theory 
The aggregate theory, which is also known as the nexus of 
contracts theory, is the third prevailing essentialist theory of the 
corporation. Although this theory initially developed in the 
nineteenth century,210 it took until the second half of the twentieth 
century to become the dominant theory of the corporation, and it 
remains so today.211 Under this theory, the corporation consists of 
individuals organizing, owning, and operating it.212 Some 
proponents of this theory extend it to include other parties, such 
                                                                                                     
 210. See Cupp, Jr., supra note 197, at 55 (“The aggregate entity theory of 
corporate personhood was . . . invoked beginning in the 1800s, and it reached 
prominence in the latter half of the century.”); Iuliano, supra note 31, at 58 
(“During the late nineteenth century, corporations were reconceived as objects of 
private, not government, creation. . . . Corporations had become collective entities 
that derived their powers from the individuals who comprised them.”); Phillips, 
supra note 206, at 1065 (“[D]uring the latter part of the nineteenth century some 
theorists began to use partnership analogies to describe the corporation, thereby 
characterizing it as an aggregate formed by private contracting among its human 
parts.”). 
 211. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs’ Failures: Fiduciary Duties When Managers 
of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 199, 246 (“The dominant view in law and economics scholarship treats 
corporations as a nexus of contracts.”); Meredith R. Miller, Contracting Out of 
Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability: An Argument Against 
Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REV. 365, 365–66 
(2008) (“In the field of corporate law, the ‘nexus of contract’ model is the dominant 
theoretical explanation of the law concerning the management of corporations. 
Under this view, corporations are nothing more than a network of contracts 
between voluntary, private actors.”); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to 
Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 924–25 (2005) (“Corporate law scholars have 
themselves questioned images of personhood, but the dominant response has been 
to characterize corporations as nothing more than a nexus of efficient contracts 
dedicated to the maximization of shareholder wealth.”).  
 212. See Marcantel, supra note 31, at 222 n.6 (“Aggregate theory posits that 
corporations are conduits through which collections of individuals conduct 
business.”); Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession 
Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2015) (“The aggregate view rejected 
the fiction of the corporation as an artificial entity that was promoted by 
concession theory, and instead focused on the property rights of the underlying 
shareholders to conceive of the corporation as simply an association of 
individuals.”); Petrin, supra note 31, at 34 (“According to the nexus of contracts 
model, the firm consists of various explicit and implicit contracts between a firm’s 
constituencies . . . .”). 
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as creditors, employees, and customers.213 Unlike the artificial 
entity theory and real entity theory, under the aggregate theory, 
the corporation has no separate existence from the individuals 
composing it.214 The rights of the corporation are derived from 
those individuals.215 
As the real entity theory gained prominence in the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, business scholars 
wanted the opportunity to do deeper economic analysis of the firm. 
In 1937, Ronald Coase published his seminal article, The Nature 
of the Firm, which served as a foundation for modern analysis of 
the firm as a nexus of contracts.216 After a period of dormancy of 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 215, 242 (2013) (“Dominant modern corporate law theory describes a 
corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’. Under this widely-accepted theory, the 
corporation is a nexus of a set of contracts among the firm’s constituents which 
include its shareholders, as providers of capital, but also its employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and board of directors”); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 
EMORY L.J. 1257, 1273 (2011) (“The dominant metaphor for the corporation is the 
‘nexus of contracts’: The firm in this view serves a coordinating function among 
managers, shareholders, suppliers, and consumers.”); Adam F. Scales, Following 
Form: Corporate Succession and Liability Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 573, 576 
(2011) (“Dominant for now is the view that a corporation is a nexus of contracts 
among labor, capital, and management.”). 
 214. See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. 
L. REV. 25, 40–41 (2015) (“The nexus-of-contracts theory .  .  . view[s] the 
corporation not as a separate entity, but as an accumulation of private contracts 
between stakeholders.”); Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 
31, at 841 (reporting that the nexus-of-contract theory views the corporation “as 
a mere aggregation of natural individuals that is a product of private initiative 
serving a predominantly private function.”); Phillips, supra note 206, at 1071 
(“[T]he nexus-of-contracts theory refuses to recognize a meaningful corporate 
entity distinct from the components that form the corporation.”). 
 215. See Coates, supra note 195, at 815 n.50 (“Under the aggregate theory, 
the extent to which a corporation may be said to have ‘rights,’ especially 
constitutional rights, corresponds to the rights of the individuals which make it 
up.”); Iuliano, supra note 31, at 60 (“Under the aggregate entity theory, 
corporations were only capable of possessing rights that could be attributed to a 
collection of individuals.”); Petrin, supra note 31, at 9–10 (“The ‘aggregate’ or 
‘contractualist’ theory asserted that corporations . . . constituted aggregations of 
natural persons. . . . [B]oth a legal entity’s legal rights and duties were often 
seen . . . as simply those of its shareholders or other individuals that made up the 
entity.”). 
 216. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors As Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is 
the so-called nexus of contracts theory. This model’s origins fairly can be traced 
to Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase’s justly famous article, The Nature of the 
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the debate over the essential nature of the corporation, which will 
be discussed in the next Part, the aggregate theory of the 
corporation emerged as the dominant theory of the corporation as 
a result of the interweaving of law and economics that began 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s because the aggregate 
theory is well suited to allow economic analysis of the corporate 
form.217 
D. Indeterminacy 
Some scholars have argued for accepting all of the prevailing 
essentialist theories of the corporation at the same time and 
embracing the indeterminacy of the corporation.218 Each of the 
prevailing theories of the corporation has its virtues and 
                                                                                                     
Firm.”); Oman, supra note 193, at 124 (“The modern nexus of contract theory of 
the corporation traces its origin to a 1937 article by Ronald Coase.”); J. Gregory 
Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo’s Social Statics, 79 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2001) (“Coase’s 
insight that the firm is the nexus of contracts between the owners of various 
factors of production also has gained widespread acceptance among legal 
scholars.”). 
 217. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 895 (“Since the rise of the law and 
economics movement, dominant thinking about the nature of the corporation has 
coalesced around an aggregate theory of the corporation that sees the corporation 
as a ‘nexus of contracts.’”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the 
Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2006) (“Though it is 
impossible to date precisely, the Nexus-of-Contracts Paradigm achieved 
dominance in the field of corporation law near the end of the 1970s.”); Susan J. 
Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 181, 211 
n.48 (2005) (“The law and economics view, which sees the corporation as a nexus 
of contracts, has been the dominant model for thinking about the regulation of 
corporations.”). 
 218. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A 
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 464 (1989) (“Whatever the future 
interplay of theory and power, the concepts that make up theories of the 
firm— entity and aggregate, contract and concession, public and private, discrete 
and relational—will stay in internal opposition. This tendency toward 
contradiction should be accepted, not feared.”); David Million, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 262 (“Confronted with important political 
challenges, theories of the corporation have always been fundamentally 
indeterminate.”); Fenner L. Stewart, Jr., Indeterminacy and Balance: A Path to a 
Wholesome Corporate Law, 9 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 81, 85 (2012) (“[T]his article 
recommends focusing upon the indeterminacy of corporate legal theories.”). 
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drawbacks. The artificial entity theory celebrates the role of the 
state in creating the corporation, while underplaying the separate 
identity of the entity and the roles of the individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning it.219 The real entity theory celebrates the 
existence of the corporation as a distinct entity, while 
underplaying the role of the state in creating it, and the roles of 
the individuals organizing, owning, and operating it.220 Finally, the 
aggregate theory celebrates the roles of the individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning the corporation, while underplaying the role 
of the state in creating the entity and the existence of the 
corporation as a distinct entity.221 The metaphysical inquiry into 
the essential nature of the corporation is at heart the search for a 
coherent definition of the corporation, and each of the theories 
seems thin.  
Some have argued that the best way to gain a robust 
understanding of the corporation is to embrace all of the prevailing 
theories of the corporation simultaneously.222 Embracing all of the 
prevailing theories simultaneously is problematic, however, 
because the theories do contradict each other. For example, the 
artificial entity theory and the real entity conceive of the 
corporation as a distinct entity,223 but the aggregate theory 
conceives of the corporation as nothing more than a collection of 
individuals.224 In terms of corporate rights, the artificial entity 
theory suggests that all rights of the corporation are given and 
defined by the state.225 However, the natural entity theory claims 
that corporate rights derive from the separate identity of the 
                                                                                                     
 219. See supra Part IV.A (explaining artificial entity theory). 
 220. See supra Part IV.B (explaining real entity theory). 
 221. See supra Part IV.C (explaining aggregate theory). 
 222. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining that under the 
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 224. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (stating that under the 
aggregate theory, the corporation has no separate identity from the individuals 
composing it). 
 225. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing that under the 
artificial entity theory, the rights of the corporation are defined by the 
government that provided for the corporation’s existence). 
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group,226 and the aggregate theory argues that corporate rights are 
derived from the individuals organizing, operating, and owning the 
corporation as they interact with other participants in the firm and 
with parties outside of the corporation.227 Put simply, accepting the 
indeterminacy of the corporation means accepting conflicting 
theories that cannot be meshed into a coherent understanding of 
the corporation. 
Famously, in The Historic Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality,228 an article published in 1926, John Dewey wrote, 
“The fact of the case is that there is no clear-cut line, logical or 
practical, through the different theories which have been advanced 
and which are still advanced in behalf of the ‘real’ personality of 
either ‘natural’ or associated persons.”229 As a consequence, he 
concluded: 
As far as the historical survey implies a plea for anything, it is 
a plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes which arise 
from entanglement with any concept of personality which is 
other than a restatement that such and such rights and duties, 
benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and 
distributed in such and such ways, and in such and such 
situations.230 
In short, he advocated to retreat from the debate by embracing all 
of the prevailing theories of corporate personality at once, despite 
the incoherence of that position.231 Remarkably, many scholars 
adopted his position, and the debate over corporate personality did 
not re-intensify until the early 1980s, when luminaries of the law 
                                                                                                     
 226. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining that under the 
real entity theory, the rights of the corporation emerge from the separate identity 
of the group). 
 227. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (explaining that under the 
aggregate theory, the rights of the corporation are derived from the rights of the 
individuals organizing, owning, and operating the entity). 
 228. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655 (1926). 
 229. Id. at 669. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. 
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and economics movement reinvigorated the debate through 
advocacy for the aggregate theory of personality.232  
John Dewey’s proposal to embrace the indeterminacy of the 
corporation is remarkably seductive. At heart, each of the 
prevailing theories is an attempt to define what a corporation is.  
The problem is that each theory is descriptively thin, downplaying 
some attributes and favoring others.233 Despite the incoherence, 
embracing all of the theories helps to offer a thicker definition of 
the corporation. In addition, by ignoring the question of what a 
corporation is, one has time for other pursuits, whatever those 
might be. However, taking such a path seems wrong for a variety 
of reasons. First, backing away from any intellectual pursuit 
simply because it is difficult is not acceptable. Otherwise, a myriad 
of human problems would never be solved. Second, theories of the 
corporation matter now in a way that they have not in the past. As 
cases like Citizens United234 and Hobby Lobby235 demonstrate, the 
legal rights of corporations are evolving.236 For litigation of these 
issues to occur properly, society must know what corporations are 
in the first place. Third, none of the prevailing theories of the 
corporation, even if joined together, provide a complete answer of 
what is a corporation. Fourth, a better theory of the firm, 
collaboration theory, exists.  
                                                                                                     
 232. See Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 31, at 1650 
(“Many commentators view John Dewey’s 1926 Yale Law Journal article as 
having put an end to the corporate personhood debate.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1527 (2004) (“[T]he debate [over 
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pragmatist philosopher John Dewey published an article in this journal arguing 
that the various views collapsed into each other, and each could be used to support 
any outcome on a particular issue.”); Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and 
the Tax Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 866 
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been responsible for the sudden end of debate on the issue . . . .”). 
 233. See supra Part IV.A–C (providing an overview of the prevailing 
essentialist theories of the corporation). 
 234. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 235. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 236. See Pollman, supra note 187, at 642 (“A new dynamic between federal 
corporate rights and state corporate law has emerged . . . [w]ith the Court’s recent 
decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. . . . .”). 
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V. Collaboration Theory 
In developing an essentialist theory of the corporation, one is 
trying to define what is a corporation. Each of the prevailing 
theories offers an incomplete definition of the corporation. As 
previously discussed, each of the theories emphasizes certain 
aspects of the firm, while underemphasizing other aspects.237 The 
problem, however, is much deeper than that. Each of the theories 
explains how the corporation exists but fails to explain why the 
corporation exists. A proper theory of the corporation should do 
both. 
To state this issue a bit more concretely, consider how to define 
a bridge. One could define a bridge as an artificial entity created 
by the government. This would be the artificial entity theory of the 
bridge.238 One also could also define a bridge simply as an object 
that exists. This would be the real entity theory of the bridge.239 
Finally, one could define a bridge as a sum of its parts in a certain 
arrangement. This would be the aggregate theory of the bridge.240 
The problem is that none of these theories offers a robust and 
proper definition of what a bridge happens to be. A better 
definition of a bridge would be “[a] structure spanning and 
providing passage over an obstacle.”241 This definition provides an 
explanation of how a bridge exists, i.e., as a “structure,” and why a 
bridge exists, i.e., “providing passage over an obstacle.”242 In the 
absence of answering both questions, one has not created a fully 
formed definition of a bridge. The same is true with trying to 
develop an essentialist theory of the corporation. This is especially 
true if you want to draw normative implications from a theory of 
                                                                                                     
 237. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the reasons for embracing the 
indeterminacy of the corporation).  
 238. See supra Part IV.A (providing an overview of the artificial entity theory 
of the corporation). 
 239. See supra Part IV.B (providing an overview of the real entity theory of 
the corporation). 
 240. See supra Part IV.C (providing an overview of the aggregate theory of 
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the corporation.243 A more robust theory of the corporation yields 
more robust normative conclusions. 
Collaboration theory answers the questions of both how and 
why corporations exist. Under this theory, which I have developed, 
the corporation is a collaboration among the government and the 
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation.244 
As a result, this theory explains how the corporation exists—as a 
collaboration. Collaboration theory also explains why the 
corporation exists. A collaboration can be defined as a common 
effort between or among multiple entities to accomplish a task or 
project.245 In regard to for-profit corporations, the common project 
among the government and those organizing, operating, and 
owning the entity is economic development and economic gain.  The 
interests of the parties do diverge somewhat. The state 
government is interested in societal economic development and 
economic gain,246 but the individuals organizing, operating, and 
owning the corporation are looking for personal economic 
development and gain.247 However, parties often enter into 
                                                                                                     
 243. See infra Part VI.A–B (discussing some of the normative implications of 
collaboration theory). 
 244. Collaboration theory may be defined to include other parts, such as 
creditors, customers, and the general public. The exact scope of the collaboration 
and relationships among collaborating parties will be left for another day. 
 245. See Collaborate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 243 (11th 
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246. See Andrew I. Gavil, Competition and Cooperation on Sherman Island: 
An Antitrust Ethnography, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1242 (1995) (reporting that 
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raising capital”); H. C. Robinson, Shifted Personhood: Corporations, Technology, 
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promoting economic development by granting corporate charters and franchises 
to private investors.”); Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: The Social 
Utility of the Private Foundation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 364 (2006) 
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incorporation laws to make it easier for people to pursue commercial aspirations, 
opening the door to greater economic participation.”). 
 247. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that for-profit 
corporations are created and are to be managed primarily to make a profit for 
shareholders). 
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arrangements referred to as collaborations with far more divergent 
interests than those collaborating within the corporate form.248  
Collaboration theory also offers a fuller view of the corporation 
in other ways as well. For example, collaboration theory clarifies 
why corporations have separate entity status. This theory achieves 
this by building upon the work of Otto von Gierke, who argued that 
groups have identities that are separate and distinct from the 
individuals composing them.249 As mentioned above, Gierke’s work 
helped popularize the real entity theory during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.250 Collaboration theory takes Gierke’s 
work one step further by arguing that because collaborations allow 
individuals to achieve more than they ever could on their own that 
the corporation should be viewed as having a separate and distinct 
status from the government and the individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning the entity.251 
Collaboration theory also explains why the government has 
the ability to regulate the rights of corporations to a greater degree 
than actual human beings. Because the government is a 
collaborator in the entity, it has the ability to guide its existence 
                                                                                                     
 248. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint 
Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73, 77 (2012) (“Collaborations  
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through law and regulation.252 In a myriad of different areas, 
collaboration theory has normative implications. A complete 
discussion of all these areas is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
a significant amount can and will be said about collaboration 
theory’s application to tax avoidance. 
VI. Collaboration Theory and Tax Avoidance 
One of the major problems with the prevailing theories of the 
corporation is that their normative implications are very limited.253 
The artificial entity theory, real entity theory, and aggregate 
theory each have some descriptive appeal, but they fail to fully 
describe the corporation.254 As a consequence, in attempting to 
resolve fundamental issues regarding the corporation, each of 
these theories often provides little or no guidance. With tax 
avoidance, for example, one might argue that the artificial entity 
theory suggests corporate managers should not engage in tax 
avoidance because of the close relationship with the state, but such 
an argument would be attenuated at best.255 The real entity theory 
and aggregate theory seem to be no help in answering questions 
relating to tax avoidance at all.256 
Collaboration theory does a much better job providing 
guidance as to whether corporate managers should engage in tax 
avoidance activities. As will be explored in the remainder of this 
Part, two viable models for addressing tax avoidance issues can be 
derived from collaboration theory.257 However, between these two 
models, this Article argues that collaboration theory should be 
                                                                                                     
 252. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (describing collaboration as a 
“common effort” which suggests that all parties have a role to play in shaping that 
collaboration).  
 253. See supra Parts IV.A–C (providing an overview of the prevailing 
essentialist theories of the corporation). 
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understood to preclude corporate managers from engaging in 
aggressive tax avoidance and perhaps any tax avoidance at all.258 
A. The Good Faith Model 
As previously explained, collaboration theory posits that the 
corporation is a collaboration among the government and the 
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the entity.259 
Although the collaboration makes the corporation much more 
substantial and robust than most contractual relationships, the 
relationship among the government and the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the firm is contractual in 
nature.260 Importantly, under the aggregate theory, which has 
been refined into the nexus of contracts theory, the focus is on the 
contractual relationship among the individuals organizing, 
owning, and operating the firm.261 Collaboration theory is different 
because it shifts and expands the focus to include the 
government.262 
The contractual underpinnings of collaboration theory offer 
one model for corporate managers deciding whether to engage in 
tax avoidance, which I will term the “good faith model.”  Implicit 
within every contractual relationship is a duty of good faith that 
requires parties to treat each other well within the scope of their 
agreement.263  
                                                                                                     
 258. See infra Part V.C (arguing that the good faith model should always be 
chosen over the profit seeking model in instances related to tax avoidance). 
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Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment At-Will 
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Similarly and relatedly, within business forms, collaborators 
have an obligation to treat each other with a duty of good faith 
within the scope of their relationship. As Benjamin Cardozo 
described it in Meinhard v. Salmon,264 while he was serving as 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals at the time of the 
opinion: “Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, 
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest 
loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there 
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”265 
Under collaboration theory, the parties composing the firm are 
bound by duties of good faith that emanate from the contractual 
relationship of the parties and from the business form itself.  
As a result, corporate managers should not deprive the 
government of the tax revenue that it hoped to generate through 
the creation of the corporation. As previously discussed, under 
collaboration theory, the collaboration is defined as a common 
effort between or among multiple entities to accomplish a task or 
a project.266 In regard to for-profit corporations, the common 
project is economic development and economic gain for the parties 
involved.267 When corporate managers engage in tax avoidance, 
they violate the duty of good faith by treating the government 
abusively, and they frustrate at least one of the government’s 
purposes for entering the contract, i.e., to procure funds via 
taxation for purposes of maintaining and improving the state.268 
B. The Profit Seeking Model 
                                                                                                     
of good faith and fair dealing.”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54 (2013) (“Courts have recognized that every contract 
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 265. Id. at 546. 
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Tension certainly exists between the implied duties of good 
faith within the firm and the deal that the government has struck 
with the individuals organizing, operating, and owning the 
corporation.269 The state and the individuals organizing, operating, 
and owning the corporation have expressly agreed to create a 
for-profit corporation, which must seek profit.270 Because lowering 
a corporation’s tax burden is one of the ways of improving the 
financial performance of the firm,271 a second potential model 
emerges under collaboration theory as to how corporate managers 
should make decisions regarding whether to engage in tax 
avoidance. 
Under this model, the analysis hinges on whether a cost 
benefit analysis demonstrates that the tax avoidance strategy is 
beneficial to the corporation. This model, which I will term the 
“profit seeking model,” involves four scenarios. In the first 
scenario, the costs of the tax avoidance activity outweigh its 
benefits. At first blush, this might seem impossible because tax 
avoidance has been defined as structuring business transactions to 
reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a manner that technically 
complies with the law, but violates the spirit or underlying policies 
of the law.272 Because tax avoidance is by definition legal, one 
might believe that its benefits would always outweigh its costs. 
However, tax avoidance has a variety of potential costs associated 
with it. These include increased government scrutiny of the 
corporation’s operations273 and public scorn of the corporation for 
not shouldering its tax burden.274 In addition, some tax avoidance 
schemes may simply be too expensive for certain corporations to 
                                                                                                     
 269. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing the implied 
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 270. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (explaining that for-profit 
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undertake.275 For example, a small corporation in Nebraska is 
unlikely to go through the time and expense of setting up foreign 
subsidiaries to obtain a favorable tax rate on a portion of its 
income. Under the profit seeking model, based upon the profit 
seeking nature of the corporation, corporate managers should 
refrain from engaging in the tax avoidance strategy when its costs 
exceed its benefits. 
In the second scenario, the tax avoidance activity is cost 
neutral. In this scenario the cost of setting up the tax avoidance 
scheme or the negative repercussions of the tax avoidance scheme 
are equal to any benefit that could be reaped. Under the profit 
seeking model of the corporation, the agreement that the 
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation is 
that they will seek a profit.276 What is confounding about scenario 
two is that any cost or benefit cancel each other out. At this point 
in the profit seeking model, the fiduciary duties discussed in the 
previous section would come into play to tip the scales in favor of 
not undertaking the tax avoidance activity because the express 
agreement to seek profits within the corporation would provide no 
guidance, and as a consequence, the state should be allowed to 
obtain the tax revenue.277 
In the third scenario, the cost benefit analysis is uncertain, 
and the tax avoidance activity may lead to an economic benefit, or 
it may lead to a loss. Although debatable, the tax avoidance 
activity once again should not be undertaken. When the cost 
benefit analysis is uncertain, the duties of good faith that emanate 
from contractual nature of the collaboration and the business form 
itself should be enough to require corporate managers not to 
engage in the tax avoidance activity. The government has allowed 
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for the creation of the corporation in part as a means of generating 
tax revenue, and when in doubt, corporate managers, rather than 
engaging in tax avoidance, ought to err on the side of allowing the 
government to collect revenue. 
Finally, in the fourth scenario, the cost benefit analysis 
suggests a clear financial benefit to the firm through undertaking 
the tax avoidance activity. Under the profit seeking model, one 
would have to argue that because the corporation exists to make a 
profit, that the tax avoidance activity must be undertaken.278 
However, as will be explained in the next section, this view of the 
collaboration between the government and individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning the corporation is too simplistic. 
C. Choosing the Good Faith Model 
At first blush, collaboration theory seems problematic because 
it seems to suggest that both the good faith model and profit 
seeking model are appropriate for corporate managers to use in 
determining whether to engage in tax avoidance. In some 
instances, this does not matter. When the costs of tax avoidance 
outweigh the benefits, when the tax avoidance strategy is cost 
neutral, and when the cost benefit analysis is uncertain, both 
models suggest that tax avoidance activities should not be 
undertaken.279 The problem arises in regard to tax avoidance 
activities with a clear financial benefit because the profit seeking 
model suggests that they should be undertaken, and the good faith 
model suggests the reverse.280 
Resolving this problem turns on the deal that the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation struck with the 
state in collaborating to form the corporation. In general, that deal 
is to seek profit because the common project, which is the basis of 
                                                                                                     
 278. See supra Part II.B (discussing the potential benefits of tax avoidance, 
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the collaboration, is economic development and economic gain.281 
The individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation 
are seeking their own economic development and economic gain, 
and the government is seeking societal economic development and 
economic gain. As a result, the corporate managers are required to 
seek profit. Elsewhere, I have argued that the profit seeking model 
requires corporate managers to decline to engage in socially 
responsible acts, if the financial benefit to the corporation is 
clear.282 If the government is unhappy about the acts, then it has 
the ability to pass positive law to alter the cost-benefit analysis.283 
Therefore, in general, the profit seeking model should be preferred 
over the good faith model. 
However, in regard to tax avoidance, the good faith model 
should be preferred to the profit seeking model. This means that 
tax avoidance is to be avoided in all circumstances. This includes 
circumstances in which a clear financial benefit exists from the tax 
avoidance activity, i.e., circumstances involving tax avoidance 
activities that the profit seeking model would require corporate 
managers to pursue. In short, tax is different. The reason for this 
is the deal that is struck between the government and the 
individuals organizing, operating, and owning the corporation. A 
for-profit corporation unsurprisingly exists to make a profit,284 and 
under collaboration theory, the government and the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation have created 
the entity for purposes of economic development and economic 
gain. When corporate managers engage in tax avoidance, they 
frustrate one of the government’s main reasons for collaborating 
within the corporate form (i.e. to procure funds via taxation for 
purposes of maintaining and improving the state).285 Therefore, 
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this Article takes the position that in regard to tax avoidance 
issues, the good faith model is the correct model to use because it 
correctly reflects the deal that the individuals organizing, 
operating, and owning the corporation struck with the 
government. 
D. Lingering Concerns About the Good Faith Model 
Although the good faith model is the appropriate method of 
applying collaboration theory to tax avoidance decision-making, a 
few lingering concerns can be raised, including why the 
corporation should limit tax avoidance in regard to the federal 
government, when the state government allows for its 
incorporation; why tax minimization is permissible, while tax 
avoidance is not; and how to limit or eliminate tax avoidance, when 
it has a relatively vague definition. Each of these concerns will be 
addressed in turn. 
The good faith model of applying collaboration theory to 
corporate tax avoidance creates questions as to why the 
corporation should refrain from tax avoidance in regard to the 
federal system of taxation because the collaboration is among the 
state government and the individuals organizing, operating, and 
owning the corporation. In terms of the corporation’s state tax 
burden, the good faith model speaks directly as to why the 
corporation should not engage in tax avoidance.286 This is because 
incorporation occurs at the state level in the United States.287 The 
                                                                                                     
 286. See supra Part VI.A (explaining the good faith model).  
 287. See M. Thomas Arnold, “It's Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Using Bounty 
Hunters to Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 424 (2010) 
(“Corporation law historically has been a matter of state law. Most corporations 
are formed under state law and are, for the most part, governed by state law.”); 
Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing Corporate Law, 
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 381 (2016) (“In the United States, corporations are 
creatures of statute, created almost exclusively at the state level, with Delaware 
being the most popular state of incorporation.”); Elizabeth Kingsley & John 
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide 
in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 60 (2004) (“Nonprofit corporations or associations, like their 
for-profit counterparts, are creatures of state law.”). 
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issue then becomes why the corporation should not engage in 
aggressive tax avoidance in regard to its federal taxes as a means 
of improving the firm’s financial performance because the federal 
government is not a direct party to the collaboration. The 
obligation not to engage in tax avoidance on the federal level is 
derivative of the duty to the state government. The state 
government entered the collaboration with the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation for purposes of 
economic development and economic gain.288 A strong federal 
system helps to enable these pursuits through, for example, 
maintaining a strong national economy and maintaining a strong 
system of national defense.289 Notably, the need for a strong 
national government to help to protect and enhance the states was 
one of the animating reasons for the transition from the Articles of 
Confederation to the Constitution, which provides the federal 
government with the power to tax.290 As a result, the obligation not 
                                                                                                     
 288. See supra Part V (providing an overview of collaboration theory). 
 289. See Swati Agrawal, Trusts Betrayed: The Absent Federal Partner in 
Immigration Policy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 755, 793 (1996) (“Division of power 
between the state and federal governments fosters efficiency of governance. 
Efficient distribution of power means that the federal government 
is . . . responsible for harmonizing and unifying policy regarding foreign and 
interstate relations . . . .”); Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking 
How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 885 (2005) (“The 
Framers of the Constitution’s selection of a federalist form of government was a 
compromise that was designed both to insure the existence of a strong central 
government, which was lacking under the Articles of Confederation, and to 
accommodate and protect the interests of the existing state governments.”); David 
M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453, 
485 (2012) (“[S]tates do not have the same responsibilities [as the federal 
government] (for example, for national defense), and usually can depend on help 
from the federal government in an emergency.”).  
 290. See Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and 
Counterfeiting (CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 358 (2016) (“An essential failing of 
the articles of confederation of the United States, the constitutional precursor to 
the current United States constitution, was finance: the articles of confederation 
provided no independent taxation power to the confederal government . . . .”); 
John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal for a Constitutionally 
Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 506 (2013) (“It is 
uncontroverted that the principal reason for adopting the Constitution in lieu of 
the old Articles of Confederation was to enhance the taxing power of the federal 
government.”); Steven J. Willis & Hans G. Tanzler IV, Affordable Care Act Fails 
for Lack of Uniformity, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 86 (2016) (“The 
Constitution is substantially about the taxing power: the Articles of 
Confederation failed, at least in part, because Congress had no power to tax.”). 
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to engage in federal tax avoidance is in fact derivable from the 
duties owed to the state under collaboration theory. One would 
have a hard time arguing that the states would be able to engage 
in effective economic development if the federal government is 
starved of funds through corporate tax avoidance.291 
A second concern regarding the application of collaboration 
theory to tax avoidance using the good faith model is that it creates 
questions as to why tax minimization is permissible, while tax 
avoidance is not. If depriving the government of revenue as a result 
of tax avoidance strategies is not permissible, depriving the 
government of revenue as a result of tax minimization strategies 
appears to be troubling as well because tax minimization also 
deprives the government of revenue.292 The difference, however, is 
that tax minimization is both legally permissible and acceptable 
by the government.293 As explained earlier, for purposes of this 
Article, tax minimization occurs when a taxpayer reflectively 
makes tax compliance decisions with the goal of reducing that 
taxpayer’s tax burden within the intended scope of the law.294 In 
contrast, tax avoidance means the structuring of business 
transactions to reduce a firm’s tax obligations in a manner that 
technically complies with the law but violates the spirit of the 
law.295 Under collaboration theory, tax minimization is 
permissible, while tax avoidance is not, based on the deal that has 
been struck between the government and the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation.296 In terms of 
                                                                                                     
 291. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40638, FEDERAL 
GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40638.pdf (“In 
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 292. See supra Part II.A (discussing tax minimization as a means of lowering 
a corporation’s tax burden). 
 293. See supra Part II.A (exploring the spectrum of tax compliance behavior, 
which includes tax avoidance). 
 294. See supra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax minimization). 
 295. See supra Part II.A (providing a definition of tax avoidance). 
 296. See supra Part VI.A (describing the contractual underpinnings of 
collaboration theory and the good faith obligation tied to those underpinnings). 
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the deal struck, the idea is that to reap the benefits of the 
collaboration, the individuals organizing, operating, and owning 
the corporation will comply with the law.297 In regard to tax 
minimization, as defined in this Article, the individuals 
organizing, operating, and owning the corporation are in full 
compliance with the letter and spirit of the law.298 In regard to tax 
avoidance, those individuals are not.299 Although those individuals 
are violating only the spirit of the law through tax avoidance, one 
would have a difficult time arguing that the deal struck with the 
government was that those individuals could be abusive to the 
laws and regulations of the government. 
A third and final complaint that could be lodged against the 
good faith model and collaboration theory in general as applied to 
tax avoidance is that it does not provide a bright-line standard for 
purposes of helping corporate managers make tax compliance 
decisions. The spectrum of tax compliance behavior discussed 
above does not provide crisp, clean categories of tax compliance 
behavior because these categories blend and blur into each 
other.300 As a consequence, in the business world, one may have 
difficulty distinguishing tax avoidance from tax minimization or 
tax avoidance from tax evasion.301 Although a bright-line standard 
would be nice, legal mandates upon the business world are often 
not crisp and clear. For example, the fiduciary duties discussed 
above have filled reporters with cases in which courts struggle with 
                                                                                                     
 297. See supra Part VI.A (noting that, since the government is an essential 
part of the overall collaboration, corporations should not deprive the government 
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 298. See supra Part II.A (defining the term “tax minimization” and providing 
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their contours and implementation.302 Although collaboration 
theory may not provide perfect guidance in regard to what to do in 
making tax strategy decisions, applying the theory in this context 
still demonstrates that a legal mandate exists not to engage in tax 
avoidance, and it provides more guidance than simply ignoring the 
true nature of the firm. 
VII. Conclusion 
As a result of recent tax reform, the permissibility of tax 
avoidance is a hot legal issue. The essential nature of the corporate 
form offers an excellent place to begin in understanding when and 
to what extent engaging in tax avoidance is mandated. This 
approach has not been taken before in the existing literature. By 
understanding the corporation as a collaboration between the 
government and the individuals organizing, operating, and owning 
the corporation, the impermissibility of aggressive corporate tax 
avoidance becomes apparent. Collaborators in business ventures 
owe each other a duty of good faith, and the contractual nature of 
the corporation carries with it a duty of a good faith as well. As a 
result, the notion becomes fanciful that depriving the government 
of revenue through aggressive corporate tax avoidance strategies 
is required or even permissible. Tax avoidance is by definition 
violating the spirit of the law, and it is an affront to the 
collaboration that forms the foundation of the corporate form 
because it frustrates one of the government’s purposes for entering 
the collaboration (i.e. gaining revenue).  
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